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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
Utah Supreme Court by § 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Anno.. (1953 
as amended), providing for appellate jurisdiction over 
orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
This is an appeal of a quiet-title action involving real 
property located in Cache County, Utah, and tried before the 
Fifth District Court in that county, without a jury, before 
the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court err in failing to rule on 
appellant's Motion in Limine? 
2. Are the Trial Court's Memorandum Ruling, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law substantially supported by the 
evidence adduced at trial? 
3. Did the Trial Court misapply the law in determining 
that no implied trust arose between the parties? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
OLESON, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Appeal No. 870152 
Category No. 13b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE* 
Defendant-respondent, Barbara Lynn Jeppson aka Barbara 
Lynn Oleson Jeppson deems it necessary to present her 
statement of the case since the statement submitted by 
plaintiff-respondent, Victor LaMar Oleson, is incomplete and 
contains extra-judicial conclusions, misstatements and 
statements not supported by the record with evidence adduced 
at trial. 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a quiet-title action instituted in the court 
*References to the court's file are designated as follows: 
Record R. .) ; Exhibits (E. ) ; Transcript (T. ) . 
References to the Addendum are designated as (A. ). 
below by plaintiff-respondent Victor Lamar Oleson 
(hereinafter "Mr. Oleson") and his wife, Thelma Dee Oleson, 
involving real property located in Cache County, Utah. Mr. 
Oleson appeals the decision of the court below quieting title 
to this real property in defendant-respondent Barbara Lynn 
Jeppson (hereinafter "Ms. Jeppson") as fee simple owner and 
denying the Olesons an interest in this property. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. Oleson and his wife Thelma Dee Oleson filed a 
Complaint against Ms. Jeppson seeking to establish their 
ownership rights to real property titled in Ms. Jeppson's 
sole name. The Olesons claimed ownership to the property on 
grounds of expressed trust, implied trust, contract, unjust 
enrichment, and adverse possession solely by payment of taxes 
(R.l; A.61). Ms. Jeppson filed her Answer denying these 
claims and counterclaimed against the Olesons to quiet title 
in her sole name (R.10,43). Mr. Oleson filed his Motion in 
Limine seeking to exclude evidence at trial of sexual 
activity between himself and Ms. Jeppson. (R.41) Following 
conclusion of discovery, the case was tried before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, sitting without a jury. Mr. 
Oleson's Motion in Limine was argued at the opening of trial. 
(T.3-8) Upon his agreement, the issue was taken under 
advisement to allow the court to determine the propriety of 
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the Motion in Limine as evidence developed at trial, subject 
to Mr. Oleson's objections during trial and the court's 
rulings thereon. (T.6-8) At trial the court received Ms. 
Jeppson's trial Memorandum (R.51; A.4), testimony of the 
Olesons and Ms. Jeppson, and documentary evidence. After 
trial, the court further received the Oleson's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities (R.67; A.18), Ms. Jeppson's Reply 
(R.78; A.29), and heard closing argument of counsel before 
entering his Memorandum Decision (R.90; A.39). Thereafter, 
the court entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R.99; A.43), and Decree and Judgment (R.106; A.50), upon the 
approval of Mr. Oleson's attorney who then filed his 
Withdrawal of Counsel. (R.95) Mr. Oleson filed his Notice of 
Appeal on March 9, 1987. (R.109) 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The court below entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree and Judgment on February 10, 
1987, denying the Oleson's claims of interest in the real 
property and quieting title to this property in Ms. Jeppson 
as sole owner. (R. 99,106; A.43,50) 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1961, Mr. Oleson purchased certain real 
property and associated water rights located in North Logan, 
Cache County, Utah, from John and Clara Krebs, which was 
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conveyed to him for payments by warranty deed he subsequently 
recorded on November 7, 1969, (T.31,32; E.l; A.2). 
On November 7, 1969, Mr. Oleson later prepared, signed, 
and recorded a warranty deed conveying a portion of this real 
property to Ms. Jeppson without water rights (T. 88, E.2; 
A. 3). His warranty deed to Ms. Jeppson recites the sum of 
$10 and other valuable consideration, contains no exceptions 
or reservations to the property conveyed, and is unambiguous 
on its face (E.2; A.3). Although Mr. Oleson claims 
otherwise, Ms. Jeppson recalls no conditions to her title in 
this property (T.66,124). 
Mr. Oleson had previously been married for eight years 
to Ms. Jeppson's mother from whom he was divorced in 1957 
(T.29). Ms. Jeppson shared the same home with Mr. Oleson 
during her adolescence as his stepdaughter (T.122,129), and 
an illicit sexual relationship developed between the two 
which continued until approximately 1956 (T.85,130). 
Thereafter, and continuing through the time Mr. Oleson 
conveyed the real property to Ms. Jeppson on November 7, 
1969, when she was 29 years old, the parties confided in one 
another and remained close social friends though they had no 
legal relationship between one another. (T.85-86,95,125,130) 
Ms. Jeppson testified at trial that she had told Mr. 
Oleson of her marital difficulties and therapy resulting from 
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their incestuous relationship (T.131). When Mr. Oleson 
conveyed the property to her on November 7, 1969, he told her 
he was sorry about this relationship and that he was giving 
the property to her as a gift (T.132-134). 
Mr. Oleson and his wife testified that when Mr. Oleson 
conveyed the property to Ms. Jeppson on November 7, 1956, Mr. 
Oleson agreed to maintain the property and pay the taxes on 
it that Ms. Jeppson could not afford but that Ms. Jeppson 
accepted the property only in trust for Mr. Oleson as a sham 
transaction to prevent his wife from claiming an interest in 
the property. (T.38,113,88-89). Mr. Oleson claimed he had 
previously discussed this method of placing the property 
beyond his wife's claims with Ms. Jeppson some two years 
earlier, but at the time of such discussion he was unmarried 
(T.87). Further, at the time of Mr. Oleson's conveyance to 
Ms. Jeppson on November 7, 1969, his wife was present (T.88), 
and joined him in executing the warranty deed without water 
rights covering only a portion of the total acreage Mr. 
Oleson purchased from the Krebes (T.88,92,110;E.2;A.3). Mr. 
Oleson' s wife was not a party to the entire conversation 
between Mr. Oleson and Ms. Jeppson on that day (T.107,121). 
For ten years following his conveyance of the property 
to Ms. Jeppson there was no occasion for the parties to 
discuss the property (T.89). The parties resided outside 
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Utah in separate states (T.90), and Mr. Oleson paid taxes on 
the entire acreage including Ms. Jeppson's portion, through 
1979 (T.123). He also arranged for a third party to use the 
total acreage in return for maintaining it as had been done 
in the past (T.58,90f95) . It was not until 1979, when Mr. 
Oleson requested Ms. Jeppson to deed this property to Mr. 
Oleson7s sisters that any dispute arose between the parties 
as to ownership (T.94-95). Ms. Jeppson refused to transfer 
title to the property, and from 1979 forward she paid taxes 
on the land for at least three years prior to the time Mr. 
Oleson filed his quiet-title action (T.95,123) and for the 
years thereafter (T.123). As late as July, 1980, Mr. Oleson 
advised Ms. Jeppson against selling this land at depressed 
prices but encouraged her to do so if she needed the money 
(T.97,99-100; E.12; A.53). He did not record a notice of 
interest in the property he conveyed to Ms. Jeppson until 
December 1, 1982, (T.93,94). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Oleson asserts procedural error in the court below 
for its failure to rule on his Motion in Limine at the 
beginning of trial. However, he cites no authority for his 
position and it is clear from the law that a Motion in Limine 
is a device used to preclude prejudicial statements and 
questions from hearing by a jury. Braden v. Hendricks, 695 
6 
P.2d 1343 (Okl. 1985). Here, the trial was before the bench 
sitting without a jury, and there was no possibility that the 
evidence sought to be excluded would be heard by a jury to 
Mr. Oleson's prejudice. Therefore, the court committed no 
reversible error in failing to rule on the Motion in Limine 
at the time requested by Mr. Oleson. 
Mr. Oleson is clearly dissatisfied with the rulings of 
the court below on the issues related to the case. That 
court, however, was in an advantageous position to observe 
the witnesses, hear their testimony, and weigh the evidence 
under the totality of the circumstances related to the 
issues. Despite the subjective dissatisfaction of one party 
to a case in equity, unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the determinations of the trial court, 
the carefully considered rulings of that court should not be 
disturbed. Baker v. Patee. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, Mr. Oleson has failed to show that 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the determinations 
of the court below. The trial court was presented with firm 
evidence substantially supporting its findings. The 
determinations of the trial court were in accordance with the 
law related to the issues. As such, the rulings of the court 
below, and its judgment, must be affirmed in their entirety. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
RESERVED RULING ON THE MOTION 
IN LIMINE. 
Mr. Oleson cites no authority for his position that the 
trial court committed reversible error in failing to rule on 
the Motion in Limine at trial of this case in equity, and Ms. 
Jeppson submits that no proper authority exists. 
A Motion in Limine is generally a pre-trial device used 
to preclude prejudicial statements and questions which have 
no proper bearing on issues in the case and which, if heard 
by iury, would interfere with a fair and impartial trial. 
Braden v. Hendricks. 695 P.2d 1343 at 1348-1349 (Okl.) 
emphasis added. Here the trial was before the bench sitting 
without a jury; there was no possibility that the evidence of 
sexual activity between Mr. Oleson and Ms. Jeppson sought to 
be excluded by the Motion in Limine would be heard by a jury 
to Mr. Oleson's prejudice. In any event, the trial judge 
necessarily heard offer of the evidence sought to be excluded 
in order to afford the court an opportunity to rule on the 
Motion (T.3-8). To grant Mr. Oleson's Motion in Limine at 
the onset of bench trial and before the court below had an 
opportunity to consider the admissability of the evidence in 
relation to other evidence would have been error. Beta Alpha 
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Shelter of Delta Tau Delta Fraternity v. Strain, 446 F.2d 626 
(1983, Ind.App.) 
As the court below noted (T.6-7), a request for ruling 
on the Motion at the beginning of trial was premature when 
the court could not then determine whether the evidence 
sought to be excluded was admissable on the issues in the 
case. Mr. Oleson's attorney agreed (T.8). The court allowed 
the evidence subject to Mr. Oleson's objections when made, 
and a motion to strike (T.7,8). Mr. Oleson never moved the 
court to strike the evidence sought to be excluded. 
Clearly under the circumstances of this bench trial, no 
prejudicial error resulted in the court reserving ruling on 
Mr. Oleson's motion. Had the court below granted Mr. 
Oleson7s motion then error would have been committed. 
POINT II 
THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE PRESUMED PROPER AND 
SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED UNLESS 
THE E V I D E N C E CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES AGAINST THEM. 
It is very apparent from Mr. Oleson's brief on appeal 
that he is dissatisfied with the Findings and Judgment of the 
court below denying him interest in the real estate conveyed 
to Ms. Jeppson. His disagreement with the trial court's 
determinations, however, is neither indicative of the 
propriety of those rulings nor of their merit. 
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This court has consistently held on innumerable 
occasions that where quiet-title and trust proceedings are 
equitable in nature, the rulings of the trial judge are 
favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is 
only in those few instances in which it is demonstrated by 
the appellant that the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's rulings such that the determinations of the 
trial court are inequitable in light of the circumstances of 
the case that the considered judgment of the trial judge will 
be disturbed. As recently stated in Baker v. Pattee, 684 
P.2d 632 (Utah 1984): 
This Court will disturb the findings of 
fact in equity cases only where the 
evidence clearly preponderates against 
them . . . We are not bound to substitute 
our judgment for that of the trial court, 
and because of its advantaged position, 
we give considerable deference to its 
findings and judgment. 
684 P.2d at 634 (footnote citations omitted). 
This standard is logically grounded upon the advantaged 
position of the trial court who has observed the witnesses, 
heard their testimony, and become acquainted in a legal sense 
with the parties, their problems, and the totality of 
circumstances relating to the issues. As observed by this 
court in Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981): 
In applying this standard [in equity 
cases that we reverse only when the 
evidence clearly preponderates against 
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the findings of the trial court], we are 
mindful of the advantaged position of the 
trial judge who sees and hears the 
witnesses and therefore give due 
deference to his decisions . . . . 
639 P.2d at 152 (footnote citations omitted). 
In view of the considerable discretion accorded to the 
trial judge and this court's requirement that the evidence 
must clearly preponderate against the trial court's 
determinations as a condition precedent to any substitution 
of the trial judge's ruling, the cases frequently note that 
this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in light most favorable to the 
prevailing party below. Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 
1979), footnote citation omitted; accord. Carnesecca v. 
Carnesecca. 572 P. 2d 708 (Utah 1977). Although the evidence 
at trial may be at odds, this alone is insufficient grounds 
to alter the determinations of the trial judge. This Court 
emphasized this principal in Ovard v. Cannon, supra, stating: 
it is well established in our 
decisional law that due to the advantaged 
position of the trial court, there is 
indulged a presumption of correctness of 
findings and judgment; and that where the 
evidence may conflict we do not upset the 
lower court's findings unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against 
them. 
600 P.2d at 1948 (footnotes omitted). 
Similarly, in Matter of Estate of Hock. 665 P. 2d 1111 
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(Utah 1982), this Court again summarized the applicable 
standard of review: 
In our review of an equity case such as 
this, we will not disturb the trial 
court's findings of fact unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against it 
. . . We apply this standard of review in 
cases involving trusts which arise by 
operation of law and in which the 
standard of proof is one of clear and 
convincing evidence* 
655 P.2d at 1114 (footnote citations omitted). 
Under the standard of review traditionally applied by 
this Court, the judgment of the court below is presumed 
proper. It must be affirmed unless Mr. Oleson has 
demonstrated that the evidence so clearly preponderates 
against the trial court's determination that the rulings of 
the court below are inequitable. 
POINT III 
MR. OLESON FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE 
A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF 
E V I D E N C E A G A I N S T THE 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE COURT 
BELOW, AND THEREFORE THE 
JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED IN 
ITS ENTIRETY. 
Although Mr. Oleson's brief makes clear his subjective 
dissatisfaction and disagreement with the determination 
entered by Judge Christofferson, he fails to show that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against those rulings or that 
the judgment of the court below is unfair. Admittedly, there 
12 
was some conflict of evidence presented by the parties at 
trial, a fact noted by the court below (T.140). However, it 
is clearly appropriate for the trial judge to make his 
determinations weighing the evidence and drawing inferences 
as may be reasonable. As noted by this Court in Search v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 649 P.2d 48 (Utah 1982): 
As we have frequently stated, in a non-
jury trial it is the trial judge's 
prerogative to find facts — including 
judging the credibility of witnesses, 
weighing the reliability of other 
evidence, and drawing reasonable 
inferences therefrom. On appeal, this 
Court reviews the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court 
findings. When there is competent 
evidence to support the findings, this 
Court must sustain them. 
649 P.2d at 50, (footnotes omitted). 
Mr. Oleson may well disagree with the determination of the 
trial judge, but that court's determinations are clearly 
supported by trial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, which are addressed by Ms. Jeppson in the 
following subheadings in response to the specific issues 
raised by Mr. Oleson in his brief not previously addressed in 
Point I, above: 
A. The Determination of the Trial Court that the 
Conveyance by Mr. Oleson to Ms. Jeppson was 
Intended to Transfer Sole Title to the Property is 
Clearly Supported bv Substantial Evidence. 
Mr. Oleson asserts in his brief (App.Br. at 1-2) that 
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the trial judge erred in "concluding" Mr. Oleson would not 
have had his wife present at the time of conveyance to Ms. 
Jeppson, or have conveyed only a portion of the entire 
acreage to Ms. Jeppson, or have waited ten years to seek 
return of the property from Ms. Jeppson if he intended the 
conveyance as one of trust to protect his property from 
future claims by his wife. Actually, these were not 
conclusions of the trial court, but rather clear findings 
reflecting Mr. Oleson's testimony at trial as set forth by 
the trial court in its Findings of Fact (R. 101-102). These 
findings are specifically supported by Mr. Oleson's own 
testimony at trial (T.38,87-89,94) , as well as documentary 
evidence (E.1,2; A.2,3). Although not a specific finding by 
the trial court, Mr. Oleson's testimony at trial was also 
that at the time he discussed deeding the property to Ms. 
Jeppson in 1967 to protect it from claims by his wife, he was 
not even married and did not marry for at least a year after 
the discussion (T.87). Based upon clear evidence, the trial 
court was certainly within its prerogative to draw inference 
that there was no intent to transfer the property to Ms. 
Jeppson in trust at the time of the conveyance. Correctly, 
the trial court determined that the conveyance was with the 
intent to transfer title to Ms. Jeppson (R.101) and that she 
is sole owner of the property (R.104). 
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B. The Determination of the Trial Court that the 
Conveyance to Ms. Jeppson was Supported by Adequate 
Consideration or Shows the Transfer to be a Gift of 
Fee Simple Title is Firmly Supported by Substantial 
Evidence and is in Accord with the Law. 
Mr. Oleson challenges the trial court's determination 
that there was adequate consideration supporting the deed 
transferring Ms. Jeppson sole title to the property, and if 
not for consideration then clear evidence shows the transfer 
to be a gift of fee simple title (App.Br. 2). 
The evidence is clear that Mr. Oleson prepared the 
warranty deed conveying the property to Ms. Jeppson (T.88). 
This deed recites as consideration "the sum of $10.00 and 
other valuable consideration." (E.2; A.3). This Court has 
long recognized that such a recital is prima facie evidence 
of the amount paid and the fact of payment. Miller v. 
Livingston. 61 P. 569 (Utah 1900). Although Mr. Oleson 
testified that Ms. Jeppson did not pay him at the time of the 
conveyance (T.41), Ms. Jeppson was uncertain whether or not 
she made payment (T.126). 
In any event, it is clearly recognized in Utah that love 
and affection is good consideration to support a deed. 
Jordan v. Jordan, 445 P.2d 765 (Utah 1968). The evidence is 
also clear that through time of conveyance the parties were 
close friends though they had no legal relationship to one 
another (T.85-86,95,125,130). In fact, Ms. Jeppson 
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previously shared the same home with Mr. Oleson as his 
stepdaughter for approximately eight years (T.122,129)* Ms. 
Jeppson was certain in her testimony that Mr* Oleson told her 
he was giving the property to her as a gift, during a time 
when she was undergoing emotional difficulties resulting from 
their prior illicit relationship which he regretted (T.131-
134) . Under the circumstances of this case, the trial 
court's determinations regarding the adequacy of 
consideration supporting the transaction and that the 
evidence shows the transaction to be intended as a gift are 
clearly supported by the facts and the applicable law. 
€• The Determination of the Trial Court that no 
Purchase Money was Paid at the Time of Conveyance 
to Ms. Jeppson is Firmly Supported by Substantial 
Evidence and is in Accord with the Law. 
Mr. Oleson asserts judicial error in the trial court's 
determination that no purchase money was paid at the time of 
his conveyance to Ms. Jeppson (App.Br.2). Evidently his 
claimed error relates to the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision at 3 referring to situations involving resulting 
trusts (See A.39). Mr. Oleson testified he purchased the 
property from John and Clara Krebes and neither Ms. Jeppson, 
nor the trial court, suggest that Mr. Oleson did not obtain 
the property from the Krebes for payment. Indeed, the trial 
court's Findings of Fact determine that he did pay for this 
property (R.100; A.44). However, he did not pay Ms. Jeppson, 
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his grantee (See E.2; A.3), for the property at the time of 
his conveyance to her. Absolutely no evidence even remotely 
suggests that Mr. Oleson paid money to Ms. Jeppson for a 
third party to convey the property to her. As analyzed by 
this Court in The Matter of Hock, 665 P.2d 1111 at 1115 (Utah 
1982) , "purchase money" payment implies a resulting trust in 
"A" under circumstances where "A" pays the "purchase money" 
for conveyance to "B." No such circumstance exists in the 
transaction between Mr. Oleson and Ms. Jeppson. Instead, "A" 
(Mr. Oleson) purchased property from the Krebeses for 
conveyance to "A" (Mr. Oleson). Later, he conveyed the 
property to "B" (Ms. Jeppson) but did not pay any money at 
the time of the transaction to "B" (Ms. Jeppson). Therefore, 
no "purchase money" (a term of art apparently misunderstood 
by Mr. Oleson) was paid at the time of his conveyance to Ms. 
Jeppson. 
D. The Determination of the Trial Court that Mr. 
Oleson told Ms. Jeppson he Would pay the Taxes on 
the Property Conveyed to her is Firmly Supported by 
Uncontroverted Evidence. 
Mr. Oleson also challenges the findings of the trial 
court that he told Ms. Jeppson he would take care of the 
taxes on the property (App.Br.2). Indeed, this is a specific 
finding by the trial judge (R.102; A.46), but it is firmly 
based upon uncontroverted testimony at trial. Mr. Oleson 
himself testified that he told Ms. Jeppson he would pay the 
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taxes on the property (T.41,49). His wife also confirmed his 
statement to Ms. Jeppson (T.113). 
E. The Determinations of the Trial Court are Firmly 
Supported by the Totality of the Evidence and are 
Presumed to be Correct. 
Mr. Oleson asserts that the trial court committed error 
in "failing to recognize the significance of" Exhibit Nos. 
11, 13 and 14, admitted as evidence at trial. These exhibits 
are three items of correspondence to him from Ms. Jeppson 
dated November, 1982, through September, 1983, essentially 
seeking unclouded title to the property in her name in an 
effort to avoid litigation over the issue (E.11,13,14). The 
correspondence was dated after 1979 when Mr. Oleson requested 
Ms. Jeppson to give up her title to the property which she 
refused to do (T.94-95), after Mr. Oleson had filed his 
notice of interest in the property (T.92-93), and after Mr. 
Oleson recorded an interloping deed to the property in his 
wife's name (T.93). At the most, these exhibits indicate 
only that Ms. Jeppson knew her title to the property was 
being clouded by claims through Mr. Oleson. Without doubt, 
the trial judge considered this evidence under the totality 
of the facts and circumstances related to the action, 
including Trial Exhibit No. 12 (E.12; A.53) which is 
correspondence to Ms. Jeppson from Mr. Oleson dated July 24, 
1980, in which he encouraged her to sell the property if she 
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need the money (T.97-101). Although Mr. Oleson places great 
significance on certain evidence to the exclusion of other 
evidence, it is the trial judge's prerogative to determine 
the facts based upon the totality of admissable evidence in 
the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court. 
Search v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 649 P.2d 48 (Utah 
1982) . The trial exhibits were admitted as evidence and the 
trial court heard the parties' testimony upon them. The 
record is devoid of any indication the trial court did not 
consider the exhibits, and in deference to the advantaged 
position of the trial judge the correctness of his 
determinations must be presumed. Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P. 2d 
1246 (Utah 1979). 
F. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Law to the 
Facts of this Case. 
Mr. Oleson asserts in his brief (App.Br. at 2) that 
Judge Christofferson misapplied the law in determining that 
no constructive trust arose between the parties in relation 
to the property conveyed to Ms. Jeppson. 
The Statute of Frauds as codified in Utah provides 
in pertinent part that: 
No estate or interest in real property . 
nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any matter 
relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned or surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or 
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conveyance in writing . . . . 
25-5-1 U.C.A. 
As provided by Section 25-5-2, Utah Code Anno. (1953 as 
amended), however, an implied trust is not within the Statute 
of Frauds and may arise in equity by operation of law through 
a resulting or constructive trust. Such a trust will be 
imposed only under limited circumstances. 
A resulting trust arises where a party pays the purchase 
price for property and a separate grantor conveys legal title 
in the same transaction to a grantee other than the person 
providing the purchase money. Matter of Estate of Hock, 665 
P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Restatement (2d) of Trust § 440 
(1959). Under such circumstances, the character of the 
transaction itself, rather than parol evidence relating to 
the intent of the parties, raises the rebuttable inference 
that the grantee was not to take the property beneficially. 
In the present case, however, there was no purchase money 
paid by Mr. Oleson at the time of his conveyance of the 
property to Ms. Jeppson (T.41). There was no grantor 
separate from Mr. Oleson who conveyed the property to Ms. 
Jeppson. The character of the transaction does not, under 
these circumstances, raise an inference against fee simple 
conveyance of the property to defendant such as to show that 
a resulting trust was created. No resulting trust arose in 
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the transaction, and the trial court properly applied the law 
to the facts in determining there to be none. 
A constructive trust is ordinarily implied in cases of 
fraud or breach of fiduciary relationship. Ordinarily, parol 
evidence is inadmissable to prove the existence of a 
constructive trust upon property where a deed of conveyance 
contains no reservations or exceptions and is presumed to 
convey fee simple title. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1979). However, parol evidence is admissable to prove 
the existence of a constructive trust upon property by clear 
and convincing evidence which must be scrutinized with great 
caution by the court. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 
(Utah 1977); Nielson v. Rasmussen. 558 P.2d 511 (Utah 1976). 
The equitable remedy of a constructive trust is applied for 
the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment, and usually 
arises only when one has unjustly profited through fraud or 
violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship. Carnesecca. supra. Such a confidential 
relationship must rise to a level approaching that of duress. 
As held in Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710 Utah (1965), 
such a confidential relationship requires that the grantor 
repose such a high degree of confidence in the grantee that 
his will is largely substituted by that of the grantee and 
the grantee is placed in a superior position in the 
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transaction; sincere affection, trust and confidence between 
the parties is insufficient to establish a constructive 
trust. 
In the present case, there is no unjust enrichment to 
defendant attributable to any wrong-doing on her part, and no 
evidence adduced at trial supports such a conclusion. Mr. 
Oleson alleges no fraud by defendant. Though the parties 
held a close personal relationship, they had no legal 
relationship between them (T.85-86,95,125,130). A close 
relationship alone is insufficient to impose a constructive 
trust based upon a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
There is simply no clear or convincing evidence which would 
indicate the creation of a constructive trust at the time of 
the transaction, and the trial court properly applied the law 
in determining that no constructive trust arose to Mr. 
Oleson's benefit in the transaction conveying the real 
property to Ms. Jeppson. 
G. The Determination of the Trial Court That There was 
Delivery of the Deed Conveying the Property to Ms. 
Jeppson is Firmly Supported by the Evidence and the 
Law. 
Although not specifically delineated as an issue in Mr. 
Oleson's brief, he argues that the trial court erroneously 
concluded that the deed was not accepted by Ms. Jeppson nor 
delivered to her, nor recorded. 
It is well settled that an otherwise valid deed must be 
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delivered to the grantee to be operative as a transfer or 
ownership of land. Wigcrel v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 
1979). Whether there has been an effective delivery is 
essentially a matter involving grantor's intent as evidenced 
from the circumstances prior to and after the date of the 
deed, including declarations of the grantors. Bennion v. 
Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); First Security Bank of Utah 
v. Burgi, 251 P.2d 297 (Utah 1952). The recording of a deed, 
however, raises a presumption of delivery which is entitled 
to great and controlling weight and which can only be 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Control 
Receivables, Inc., v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). 
Mr. Oleson's deed to defendant is regular in form, and 
he makes no claim that it is invalid on its face (E.2;A.3). 
It was properly recorded on the day it was signed by Mr. 
Oleson (T.88 ;E. 2 ;A. 3) . Ms. Jeppson acknowledged her 
acceptance of the conveyance (T.113), and at the time of the 
conveyance there is clear evidence that Mr. Oleson stated he 
was giving the property to Ms. Jeppson as a gift (T.132-
134). The parties were close friends (T.85-86,95,125,130), 
and there was no evidence before the court which would 
indicate that the deed was not physically delivered to Ms. 
Jeppson. The deed contains no reservations or exceptions 
(E.2;A.3), and as such is presumed as an expression of Mr. 
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Oleson's intent to convey fee simple title in the property to 
Ms. Jeppson. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979); 
Hatch v. Bastian. 567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977); Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); 57-1-3 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) . Mr. Oleson also did not claim an interest in the 
property conveyed to Ms. Jeppson for approximately ten years 
from the date of the conveyance. Under the circumstances and 
the facts of this case, and in accord with the law, the 
determination of the trial court that there was full 
conveyance of the property to Ms. Jeppson is firmly 
supported. 
H. The Determination of the Trial Court Denying Mr. 
01eson/s Claim of Adverse Possession is Firmly 
Supported by Substantial Evidence and is in Accord 
with the Law. 
Although not specifically delineated as an issue in Mr. 
Oleson,s brief, he argues that the court below committed 
error in denying his claim of adverse possession to the 
property he conveyed to Ms. Jeppson. 
Under Utah law there can be no adverse possession 
establishing rights in land unless the land has been occupied 
and claimed for seven continuous years during which time the 
claimant has paid all taxes on the land. 78-12-12 U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended). The purpose of the requirement of payment 
of taxes is that the making of a public record of such 
payment gives notice to the owner that his land is being 
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adversely claimed. Bowen v. Olson, 268 P.2d 983 (Utah 1934). 
Claimants acts in relation to the land must be open, 
notorious, tortious and exclusive so as to plainly manifest 
to the owner that such a claim is being made. Cooper v. 
Carter Oil Company, 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 1957). A grantor 
remaining in possession after conveyance is presumed to hold 
the premises subservient to the rights of the grantee. 
Carlson v. Sair, 472 P.2d 598, 3 Wash.App. 27 (1970); Reid v. 
Reid. 348 P.2d 29 (Or. 1959). See, 3 Am.Jur. 2nd 245; See 39 
A.L.R. 2nd 353. 
Mr. Oleson has not alleged occupation or possession for 
the requisite period of time in his Complaint, and therefore, 
his claim should fall. Even assuming such an allegation was 
sufficiently plead and tried, however, plaintiff7s acts in 
relation to the land claimed were insufficient to clearly 
manifest to Ms. Jeppson that the claim was being made. At 
the time Mr. Oleson conveyed the property to Ms. Jeppson, he 
told her he would pay the taxes on the land and maintain the 
property (T.89,113). The parties had a close relationship 
with one another which continued (T.85-86,95). From the time 
of the conveyance to Ms. Jeppson in 1969 and until 1979 when 
Mr. Oleson requested Ms. Jeppson to give up title to the 
property, the parties mostly resided outside of Utah in 
separate states (T.90). The land conveyed by Mr. Oleson to 
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Ms. Jeppson has never been separated by any enclosure from 
the separate parcel he continues to hold, nor was its use any 
different from the past and continuing use of Ms. Jeppson's 
contiguous parcel (T.90-92,95) . Mr. Oleson merely continued 
to allow a third party to use the entire acreage in return 
for maintaining the properties as he had done previously 
(T.90,95). In conformity with Mr. Oleson's promise to Ms. 
Jeppson, he paid taxes on the property and maintained it 
until 1979 when Ms. Jeppson refused to give up title to the 
property. Thereafter, Ms. Jeppson paid taxes on her land for 
at least three following years (T.123). 
Mr. Oleson's payment of taxes and acts in relation to 
Ms. Jeppson's land were entirely consistent with his 
representations at the time she was conveyed the property, 
and under the circumstances could not be said to plainly 
manifest to her that his claim of adverse possession was 
being made. 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly showed that it was 
not until 1979 that any conflict relating to the ownership of 
the property arose which may have manifested to defendant 
that an adverse claim to her property was being made (T.94-
95) . The evidence at trial clearly shows that from 1979 
forward Ms. Jeppson paid taxes on her land for at least three 
following years, thereby precluding Mr. Oleson from asserting 
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a claim of adverse possession based upon his payment of taxes 
for seven consecutive years even if his acts in relation to 
the land from 1979 forward did manifest to defendant that a 
claim was being made. As late as July, 1980, however, Mr. 
Oleson wrote defendant a letter advising her not to sell her 
land at depressed prices since it was valuable and she could 
build on it, but encouraging her to do so if she needed the 
money (E.12; A.53). As noted by the trial judge in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this evidence 
clearly contradicts Mr. Oleson's claim of adverse possession 
to the entire acreage he conveyed to Ms. Jeppson ten years 
earlier (R.103). Under the circumstances, even as late as 
1980, Mr. Oleson did not clearly manifest to Ms. Jeppson a 
claim of adverse possession. 
Having failed to clearly show that his acts in relation 
to the land conveyed to Ms. Jeppson plainly manifested a 
claim of adverse possession for a period of seven consecutive 
years, and that he paid taxes on the land during that time 
period, Mr. Oleson's claim of adverse possession against Ms. 
Jeppson's interest in the land was properly denied by the 
trial court and is clearly supported by the law. 
CONCLUSION 
In cases of equity, this Court has invariably held that 
the decisions of the trial judge are to be respected unless 
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the evidence clearly preponderates against them. This 
standard of review appropriately grants deference to the 
advantage position of the trial judge who has observed the 
witnesses, listened to their testimony, and had a personal 
opportunity to perceive their problems and the facts relating 
to the issues. It is the appropriate prerogative of the 
trial court in a non-jury trial to find the facts, including 
judging the credibility of witnesses, weighing the 
reliability of other evidence, and drawing reasonable 
inferences therefrom. 
Nowhere in Mr. Oleson's brief does he successfully 
isolate an instance in which Judge Christof ferson's 
determinations are not firmly supported by substantial 
evidence and in complete accord with the law. The rulings 
entered by Judge Christofferson reflect careful and judicious 
consideration of the parties and their legal problem and 
interest. In the absence of evidence clearly preponderating 
against those rulings, they should not be disturbed on 
appeal. Therefore, Judge Christofferson's decision should be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5th day of October, 1987. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
B. L. Dart 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr. 
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WARRANTY DEED 
John P. Krebs and wifa, Clara H.. Krebs 
rs ol EaysTille, .County ©f Davis 
CONVEY s ««d WARRANT to Victor Oleson 
State of Utah, hereby 
grantee ol Sparks, Nerada 
foe the sua ol Seren Thousand Five Hundred And NO/100———* —Dollars 
the following described tract ol land in N o r t h L o g a n , C a c h e County. State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 0.50 chain* North of a point *81.80 feet East of 
. the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter of Section !*»» Township 12 
North of Ranfe 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and.Meridian, and rannlng 
thence East &9&> feet; thence North l#55f East 9.55 chains; th*nc* w»«t 
10 chains to the East Side of Field Street; thenc* South 1*55* Vest (along 
East side of said Street) &30.J0 feet; thence East lfcc feet; thenc* 
South 200 feet to the place of beginning. 
Together with ^shares of water in the Losan. Hyde Park. Smlthfleld Canal 
Cotnp&ny. 
day ol May WITNESS, the hand S of said grantor 6. this 1 s t 
Signed in the presence ol
 y 
li 
A. D. 19 bl 
STATE OF UTAH [ 
County of Cache I 
On the C 7 ^ / day o l " ^ - ^ 
A D. 19 sty personally appeared before me 
John P. Erebs and wife , Clara N. Krebs 
RECORDING DATA 
354208 l*& 
the signer
 0 of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that tfcey executed the same. 
I* V • i .•- N, 
- <M Mm 
cotwy z? zzz.i?)5S 
FltEO AWG IICiROCfl FOR 
'to* 7 4a*PH,G3 
UISOOJ 122 Cr RECORD 
fA6E 591 
•ROTA 8. SK.Td 
BOOK 122 ft&592 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
VXCIOa OLSSOH and THELMA D„ OLSSOH, husband and w i f e , a l s o knowi as £h<tloia Dee OUson, 
grantor sof tano Cownty of S ta to of Nevj<U 
State of Utah, hereby CONVEY *n<i WARRANT to 
BARBARA LINN JEFPSON 
grantees of S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake County, Utah 
for tlie sum of $10.00 .and other valuable cons iderat ion —— 
the following described trace of land in Cache County, State of Utah: 
Beginning 0.3 chains North of a point 381.81 feet Cast of the Southvest corner 
of the Southeast quarter of Section 14, Township 12 North, Range One East 
•f tha Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 484 feet; thence North 1*33* 
Bast 200 feat; thanca Vast 484 feat; thenca South 200 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor • .- this 7 th 
Signed in the presence of 
day of November A.D. 19*9 
\ ^fr^n vfi>, m/£s<?-riU. 
STATE OF UTAH \ 
County of Cache ; 
On the 7 t h day of November 
A.O. 1969 personally-appeared before me 
% , .^'TjxiiS*..pias©n and Th 
%^V5:Ai>akanil''aAdl w i f e , a l 
elma D. Oleson, 
so known as Thelma 
-vbeUtgner «s of th< within instrument, who duly 
hey executed the same. 
* 4 * * / 
^&^. a./L^J-
Notary Public 
Commission expires: 22 May 1 9 7 3 
Residing in Hyde P e r k , U t a h 
Entry No. 
RECORDING DATA 
354209 ****t.lo 
RECORDED Q 
PLATTED Q 
COMPARED Q 
INDEXED Q 
ABSTRACTED Q 
DELIVERED Q 
STATE S F ' . i . i . ;
 c c 
COUNTY CF CACHE) 5 5 
FILED AhC \SJC0RC£0 FOR 
Kov 7 4mPH f69 
IN BOCK 1 2 2 CFRECCRO 
PACE 592 
CRCTTA 8. VAXA 
_ _ COLHTY HEC0RS2R 
LAND TITLE COMPANY 
600X 122 r«£502 
B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 ) 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930) 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant 
310 South Main, S u i t e 1330 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 6 3 8 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICTOR OLSEON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
DEE OLESON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN- OLESON JEPPSON, 
MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 22515 
Defendant. Judge Christofferson 
ooo Opo o 
FACTS 
On May 1, 1 9 6 1 , p l a i n t i f f V i c t o r Oleson was conveyed 
t i t l e t o t h e undeve loped r e a l p r o p e r t y i n d i s p u t e by a p r o p e r l y 
e x e c u t e d deed from John and Clara K r e b s . T h i s deed was r e c o r d e d 
on November 7, 1 9 6 9 . That same day p l a i n t i f f conveyed a p o r t i o n 
o f t h i s p r o p e r t y t o d e f e n d a n t by warranty deed f o r the r e c i t e d 
sum o f $ 1 0 . 0 0 and o t h e r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , which deed was 
a c c e p t e d by d e f e n d a n t and recorded on t h a t d a y . The d e f e n d a n t 
was V i c t o r ' s former s t e p d a u g h t e r and a t t h e t ime o f t h i s 
c o n v e y a n c e t h e p a r t i e s were good f r i e n d s . The warranty deed t o 
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efendant contains no exception or reservations to the property 
conveyed and i s unambiguous on i t s face. 
Defendant's testimony wi l l evidence tha t a t the time of 
pla in t i f f ' s conveyance to defendant, defendant was in the process 
>f undergoing intensive psychotherapy to help her deal with 
severe, emotional and psychological trauma caused in la rge part by 
m i l l i c i t re lat ionship Victor had with defendant in her 
Ldolescence result ing in continuing e f fec t on defendant ' s 
physical and mental health. This fac t was known by p l a i n t i f f s a t 
:he time of the conveyance to defendant. Defendant's testimony 
pi l l further be that p l a i n t i f f , Victor Oleson, declared that he 
yas sorry about what the relat ionship had been and he wanted the 
property to be a g i f t to defendant. 
P la in t i f f Victor Oleson conveyed no other i n t e r e s t in 
the disputed property prior to the date the conveyance to 
defendant was recorded. Subsequently, however, Victor executed a 
warranty deed to Thelma which described, real property including 
that parcel p l a i n t i f f s previously deeded to defendant. 
P l a i n t i f f s a l lege they have acquired defendant's 
interest in the property conveyed to defendant by adverse 
possession through payment of the taxes on the land for seven 
years, however, they f a i l to assert h o s t i l e and adverse 
possession or occupation during this period. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF THELMA OLESON HAS NO RIGHTS OF RECORD IN 
THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO DEFENDANT, 
The property in dispute was conveyed by the Krebs to 
Victor Oleson in 1961, prior to Victor's marriage to Thelma. No 
interest in ttte property was conveyed to Thelma prior to the 
plaintiffs' conveyance of a portion of the property to defendant 
by warranty deed, which was recorded the day of conveyance*. 
Although Thelma joined Victor as grantor in the warranty deed 
conveying the disputed property to defendant, Thelma had no 
interest in the property at the time and therefore could convey 
no interest to defendant. The warranty deed to defendant was 
recorded prior to Victor's conveyance to Thelma of any interest 
in the property, and thereby imparted constructive notice to 
Thelma of defendant's rights in the property. Additionally, as a 
party to the conveyance to defendant, Thelma had actual notice 
of defendant's interest in the property and the conveyance to 
defendant is binding upon Thelma. 57-1-6 U.C.A.f 57-3-2 U.C.A. 
Therefore, Thelma Oleson has no rights of record in the property 
in dispute prior to those of the defendant.. 
II. PLAINTIFFS ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
IN DISPUTE BY EXPRESS TRUST OR CONTRACT AND CANNOT NOW SEEK 
CANCELLATION OF THE DEED. 
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The Statute of Frauds as Codified in Utah provides in 
pertinent part that : 
"No estate or interest in real property...nor 
any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, grantedfassigned or surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing,,,," 
25-5-1 U.C.A. 
Accordingly, under usual circumstances a.signed writing is 
required for the enforcement of any trust or contract creating an 
interest in real property. A trust in real property must be 
created bv a writing signed by the settlor or his agent. 
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981). A contract to 
acquire an interest in real property is unenforceable unless it, 
likewise, is in writing. Guinard v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 
1969)• Here, there is no writing evidencing plaintiffs1 alleged 
interest in the property by express trust or contract. 
Therefore, any such interest asserted by plaintiffs is barred by 
the Statute of Frauds, and is unenforceable at law. Further, any 
such interest asserted by plaintiffs is barred by 78-12-25 U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended) requiring an action upon a contract or 
obligation not founded upon a writing to be brought within four 
years. 
III. PLAINTIFFS ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
Iff DISPUTE BY IMPLIED TRUST AND CANNOT NOW SEEK CANCELLATION OF 
THE DEED IN EQUITY. 
4 
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Although an implied trust in not within the Statute of 
Frauds (25-5-2 O.CA) and may arise in equity by operation of law 
through a resulting or constructive trust
 4 such a trust will be 
imposed only under limited circumstances. 
A resulting trust arises in favor of a party only when 
he pays the purchase price for the property and another person is 
giv<eu legal title in the transaction. Matter of Estate of Hock, 
665 P*2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Restatement (Second) of Trust §440 
(1959). Here, at the time of the transfer of property to 
defendant, plaintiffs paid no purchase money for the property on 
defendant's behalf. Therefore, no resulting trust arose, nor 
should one be implied by the court. 
A constructive trust is usually imposed only to prevent 
unjust enrichment by one profiting through fraud, or violation of 
a duty resulting from a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). The legally 
sufficient relationship requisite to imposition of a constructive 
trust over real property must be more than sincere affection, 
trust and confidence between the parties; it requires that the 
grantor repose such a high degree of confidence in the grantee 
that his will is largely substituted by that of the grantee and 
the grantee is placed in a superior position in the transaction. 
Bradbury y. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965). The existence 
5 
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of a constructive trust must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence, and parol evidence on the issues must be scrutinized 
with great caution• Matter of Estate of Hock, Supra; Nielson 
v« Rastmissen v« Carter, 558 P.2d 511 (Utah.1976). 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege no fraud by 
defendant* Nor is there any evidence which would indicate a 
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant at 
the time of the conveyance to defendant of the property in 
dispute• Admittedly, defendant was at one time Victor's 
stepdaughter, but she was not a member of Victor*s family at the 
time of the conveyance and had no familial relationship with 
either plaintiff. Though the plaintiffs may at one time have 
held ordinary affection, trust and confidence in defendant, it 
clearly did not arise to a level of confidence whereby defendant 
was placed in a superior position over plaintiffs. To the 
contrary, if there was inequality of position, it was the 
plaintiffs who were in a superior position at the time of the 
transaction.. Defendant was at that time in a weakened emotional 
and psychological state and under treatment, for trauma resulting, 
in part, from the trust she had reposed in the plaintiff Victor 
Oleson. No requisite confidential relationship existed between 
the parties at the time of the transaction such that might imply 
the transaction to be unfair to plaintiffs or that defendant 
unjustly profited from the conveyance. The evidence does not 
6 
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clearly indicate the creation of a constructive trust at the time 
of the transaction, and none should be implied by the court. 
Further, plaintiffs are barred from now seeking cancellation of 
the deed to defendant by 78-12-25 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
requiring an action for relief not otherwise provided by law to 
be brought within four years« 
IV... PLAINTIFFS CONVEYED THE PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT IN 
EXCHANGE FOR ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION AND IN ANY EVENT CANNOT SEEK 
CANCELLATION OF THE DEED FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION, 
The warranty deed from plaintiffs to defendant recites 
as consideration "the sum of $10.00 and other valuable 
consideration." Utah courts have long recognized that such a 
riecltal is prima facie evidence of the amount paid and the fact 
of payment. Miller v. Livingston, 61 P. 569.(Utah 1900). 
Other consideration, however, may be shown to support the 
conveyance. Id. 
Here, the parties were good friends at the time of the 
conveyance to defendant. Defendant was a long-time acquaintance 
of Victor Oleson, having previously had a stepdaughter 
relationship with him for a number of years continuing through 
defendant's adolescence. Defendant kept in close contact with 
Victor, and came to know Thelma well. It is well recognized that 
love and affection is good consideration to support a deed. 
7 
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ordan v. Jordan, 445 P.2d 765 (Utah 1968). Further, when a deed 
s given in reparation by a seducer, as here, there is sufficient 
consideration to support the transaction and the deed will not be 
jet aside. Conley v. Nailar, 118 U.S. 127, 30 L Ed. 112, 6 S. 
3t» 1001 (1886). There is clearly adequate consideration 
supporting the plaintiffs' conveyance to defendant of the 
property in dispute, and it is completely understandable under 
the circumstances that the "other valuable consideration1' recited 
Ln the deed to defendant was not specified with more 
particularity. 
Even assuming the recited consideration of $10.00 was 
apt in fact paid by defendant, this alone is not a grounds for 
cancellation of the deed. As recognized in Desert Centers Inc< 
v. Glen Canyon, Inc., 356 P.2d 286 (Utah 1960), nonpayment of the 
consideration promised gives the grantor a mere lien on the 
property conveyed, and is insufficient to justify avoidance of 
the deed. Further, plaintiffs are barred from now seeking 
cancellation of the deed to defendant for lack of consideration 
by 78-12-25 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) requiring an action for 
relief not otherwise provided by law to be brought within four 
years. 
V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS CONVEYED THE 
PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT AS A GIFT OF FEE SIMPLE TITLE. 
8 
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It is well settled that an otherwise valid deed must be 
delivered to the grantee to be operative as a transfer of 
ownership of land. Wlggel v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979). 
Whether there has been an effective delivery is essentially a 
matter involving grantors1 intent as evidenced from the 
circumstances prior to and after the date of the deed, including 
declarations of the grantors. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1985). First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 251 P.2d 297 
(Utah 1952). The recording of a deed, however, raises a 
presumption of delivery which is entitled to great and 
controlling weight and which can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v« Harman, 
413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). 
The deed to defendant in the case at bar is regular in 
form, and plaintiffs make no claim that it is invalid on its 
face. It was properly recorded on the day it was signed by 
plaintiffs, and it was knowingly accepted by defendant. The 
conveyance to defendant was made at a time when defendant was 
undergoing intensive therapy to help her deal with severe 
emotional arid psychological trauma caused in large part by the 
illicit relationship plaintiff Victor Oleson had previously had 
with defendant, a fact known to plaintiffs. Further, plaintiff 
Victor Oleson declared the property to be a gift to defendant on 
more than one occasion. The parties at the time held affection 
9 
for one another, and defendant was in need of Victor's emotional 
support in her therapy. There is no clear or convincing evidence 
that the deed to defendant was not delivered to her as an 
Indication of Victor's support and with plaintiffs1 intent to 
relinquish all claim to the property. Quite to the contrary, 
plaintiffs1 declarations and other circumstances relating to the 
time of the conveyance indicate that the conveyance was intended 
sis a gift for defendant's benefit. The deed contains no 
reservations or exceptions, and as such is presumed as an 
expression of plaintiffs1 intent to convey fee simple title in 
the property to defendant* Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 
19.79); Hatch v. Bastian, 567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977); Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); 57-1-3 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended). The intention of the plaintiffs is not open to 
interpretation by parol evidence or otherwise where the words 
used in the grant are unambiguous (Hartman, Supra.), a situation 
present here. Plaintiffs allege no fraud or mistake, and the 
evidence simply does not support a conclusion that defendant was 
in a superior position so as to substitute her will over 
plaintiffs at the time of the transaction. Absent such 
circumstances, plaintiff grantors cannot attack or impeach their 
own deed. Desert Centers, Inc., Supra. 
10 
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VI . PLAINTIFFS ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION BY PAYMENT OF TAXES-. 
Under Utah law t h e r e can be no a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n 
e s t a b l i s h i n g r i g h t s i n land u n l e s s t h e land has been o c c u p i e d and 
c l a i m e d f o r s e v e n c o n t i n u o u s y e a r s dur ing which t i m e the c l a i m a n t 
h a s p a i d a l l t a x e s on t h e l a n d . 7 8 - 1 2 - 1 2 .U.C.A. ( 1 9 5 3 a s 
amended) . The purpose o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f payment o f t a x e s i s 
t h a t t h e m a k i n g o f a p u b l i c r e c o r d o f s u c h payment g i v e s n o t i c e 
t o the owner t h a t h i s land i s b e i n g a d v e r s e l y c l a i m e d . Bowen v . 
O l s o n , 268 P.2d 983 (Utah 1 9 3 4 ) . C l a i m a n t s a c t s in r e l a t i o n t o 
t h e l a n d must be o p e n , n o t o r i o u s , h o s t i l e and e x c l u s i v e so as t o 
p l a i n l y m a n i f e s t t o t h e owner t h a t such a c l a i m i s b e i n g made. 
Cooper v . C a r t e r O i l Company, 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 1957) . C l e a r l y 
t h e p a y m e n t o f t a x e s on t h e l a n d f o r s e v e n c o n t i n u o u s y e a r s a l o n e 
i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a c l a i m of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . 
D i l l m a n v . F o s t e r , 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982) . P l a i n t i f f s have not 
a l l e g e d o c c u p a t i o n o r p o s s e s s i o n for the r e q u i s i t e p e r i o d , and 
t h e i r c l a i m should t h e r e f o r e f a i l . Even assuming such an 
a l l e g a t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d , h o w e v e r , p l a i n t i f f s 1 a c t s i n 
d e l a t i o n t o t h e land c l a i m e d were i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c l e a r l y 
m a n i f e s t t o d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e i r c l a i m was b e i n g made. The 
p a r t i e s h e l d a f f e c t i o n for one ano ther over the y e a r s , and 
p l a i n t i f f s had p r e v i o u s l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e i r g e n e r o s i t y t o 
d e f e n d a n t by c o n v e y i n g her a p o r t i o n o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y . The 
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land conveyed to defendant is undeveloped and contiguous with the 
undeveloped parcel plaintiffs continued to hold. Plaintiffs were 
aware of defendant's treatment, the continuing nature of therapy 
arid other misfortunate financial and health conditions suffered 
by defendant* The land conveyed to defendant is not separated by 
any enclosure from the separate parcel plaintiffs continued to 
hold, nor was its use any differt from the past and continuing 
use of plaintiffs' contiguous parcel. Ordinarily, where a 
grantor continues in possession of the land after the execution 
and delivery of the deed, the grantor will be regarded as holding 
the premises subservient to the grantee. 3 Am. Jur. 2d 294; 
Reid v. Reid, 348 P.2d 29 (Or. 1959). Here, under the 
circumstances, it cannot be concluded that plaintiffs1 possession 
of the oroDerty deeded to defendant was open, notorious, hostile 
and exclusive.of defendant's interest for seven continuous years 
so as to clearly give notice to defendant of their claim< 
Plaintiffs* activities in relation to the property conveyed to 
defendant were merely indicative of their continuing concern for 
defendant's welfare and interests. Any continuing payment of 
taxes by plaintiffs from the date of the deed to defendant shows 
only that plaintiffs continued in their demonstration of moral 
obligation to defendant's benefit and on her behalf, rather than 
record notice of a hostile claim. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, Thelma Oleson, has no rights of record prior 
to defendant, since Thelma Oleson never had such an interest 
in the property prior to the time the property was conveyed to 
defendant- Since there is not writing evidencing a trust or 
contract at the time of the conveyance to defendant, plaintiffs 
are barred from asserting the same by the Statute of Frauds. Nor 
do the circumstances here indicate tht an implied trust arose at 
the time of the conveyance to defendant. The conveyance to 
defendant was for adequate consideration, or in the alterative 
was a gift from plaintiffs in entire fee simple absolute title. 
Having effectively placed absolute title to the prioerty in 
defendant's sole name, plaintiffs cannot claim any record 
interest in the property. Nor have plaintiffs since aquired an 
interest in the property by adverse possession. Their acts in 
relation to' the property were not, under the circumstances, 
continuously open, notorious, hostile and exclusive to 
defendant's interests for the requisite seven-year period. 
Respectfully, submitted, 
hf 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SUITE 202 COVE TOINT PLAZA 
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 272-8425 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooooOoooo 
VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
DEE OLESON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORIES 
and 
REOUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Civil No. 22515 
Judge Christofferson 
-oooooOooooo-
Come now the Plaintiffs, Victor Oleson, aka Victor 
Lamar Oleson, and Thelma Dee Oleson, by and through their Attorne 
John Walsh, and submits their Memorandum of Points and Authoritie 
and request that they be allowed to argue the matter orally befor 
the Court rules. 
Plaintiffs presented, what we believe to be clear and 
convincing evidence, that they had placed certain property in the 
name of the Defendant, Barbara Lynn Oleson Jeppson, his step-
daughter, for her to hold in trust. 
The evidence was undisputed that Mr. Oleson had farmed 
the land and had taken the monies received to improve the same. 
At times he leased the subject land as well. 
During the many years that he did so after having placed 
the property in his step-daughter's name, he never accounted to 
her for any of the proceeds nor did she ever request or discuss 
the same with him. He, is the most open and conspicuous way asserted 
total and exclusive ownership to the subject property. 
In addition, he paid all of the taxes into the early 
1980's, all of the water assessments, etc., with no contribution 
or concern ever expressed by the Defendant. 
Plaintiffs contend among other things, that they have 
had the property held in her name in constructive trust, as well 
as have acquired the property by adverse possession, in the alterna-
t i ve. 
There is no question that Plaintiff paid the taxes in 
excess of seven years, with no accounting or even mere inquiry 
by the Defendant. 
Defendant suggests in her Memorandum that Plaintiffs 
acquire no interest because they did not plead that they occupied 
or possessed the property for the requisite period. Note their 
Memorandum at page 11. Defendant cites Dillman vs. Foster, 656 P.2d 
974, (Utah, 1982), for the proposition that merely paying the 
taxes is not enough. 
Plaintiffs submit that this is very interesting because 
the case stands for the proposition that when one pays the taxes 
and occupies, then he acquires the property by adverse possession. 
If there is a problem with the pleadings, Counsel would 
move the Court to amend to conform to the evidence, pursuant to 
Rule 15, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In this case, the Plaintiff occupied the property xvell 
in excess of seven continuous years, and utilized the same, and 
controlled the same without even a discussion or inquiry by the 
Defendant. 
Surely there is no question that Plaintiffs occupied the 
property for the requisite time and paid the taxes for the requisite 
time, and therefore have acquired the property by adverse possession. 
As to the constructive trust or purchase money resulting 
trust theory, Plaintiffs submit that there is overwhelming case 
law supporting the claim of the Plaintiffs. 
In the case of/Matter of Estate of Hock,\655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah, 1982), which is cited by the Defendant in its Memorandum, 
at page 1115 states: (quoting another case) 
If there's no evidence as to the intention of the 
parties, other than the fact that A paid the purchase 
price for conveyance to B, a resulting trust arises 
in favor of A. It is unnecessary for A to introduce 
further evidence that the trust was intended, since 
the character of the transaction itself raises the 
inference that B was not to take the property benefi-
cially. 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs testified that they 
had without question placed the property in trust with Mr. Olesonfs 
step-daughter, whereas Defendant had no recollection at all. 
So in Hock, the presumption arises with no evidence, yet 
here there was undisputed evidence of the trust arrangement. 
In the case of/Carnesecca vs. Carnesecca,\ 572 P.2d 708, 
(Utah, 1977), which is also cited by Defendant is the following 
at page 710: 
Equity will impress a constructive trust upon property 
in favor of a beneficiary of an oral trust under certain 
circumstances and no writing evidencing an intention 
to create a trust is required. Such is an equitable 
remedy arising by operation of law to prevent unjust 
enrichment and is not within the statute of frauds. 
(Emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Defendant 
paid anything for the property. 
Surely the Defendant claims that she had been abused, but 
under univeral law, past services (giving her the best inferences 
possible) can not constitute consideration for a contract. 
She paid no money at any time for the property, and 
she performed no services (legitimate or illegitimate) during 
or after the subject conveyance, and she traded nothing nor 
exchanged anything. All of this is undisputed. 
Rather, she states that he owed her big, and that is why 
she got the property. Still she admits that she did not even 
so much as to inquire about it until in the early 1930's. 
Plaintiffs testified that a very confidential, personal 
relationship existed with the Defendant. She testified that same 
existed well into the late 1970. (Well beyond the time in question) 
Plaintiff, Mr. Oleson further testified that he inquired 
of her how to best secure his property, and she explained that the 
best way was, after talking to her attorney, to put the same in 
someone else's name. 
Pinint-nff Mr. Oleson testified that he was closer to her 
than anyone else, and that is why he put the property in her 
name. After all it was her idea. 
In the case of/Nielson vs. R.asmussen^  558 P. 2d 511, 
Utah, at page 513, is the following: 
. . -under certain circumstances existing at the 
time of conveyance in trust is made, no writing 
evidencing an intent to create a trust is required. 
In those instances, equity will impress a constructive 
trust upon the property in favor of the person or 
persons designated by the grantor as the beneficiary 
or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive 
trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust 
enrichment, arises by operation of law and is not within 
the statute of frauds. 
Note all of the Utah Supeme Court cases cited in footnote 
six on page 514. 
Lastly, in the case of Bradbury vs. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 
710, (Utah, 1965) in footnote #4, is the following on page 713: 
If a confidential relationship is show to exist, and 
a gift or conveyance is made to a party in a superior 
position, a presumption arises that the transaction was 
unfair; this presumption has the force of evidence and 
will itself support a finding if not overcome by 
countervailing evidence. The burden is upon the superior 
party to convince the court by a preponderance (not 
clear and convincing)(parenthesis original) of the 
evidence that the transaction was fair. Citing Johnson 
vs. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959); In re 
Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (19567: 
Plaintiffs submit that there is no question that a trust 
was created. Defendant paid nothing, and acted until early 1980fs 
as if she had nothing there. Please note the various exhibits 
which reflect the fact that she know all along that it was not 
hers, and that is why she made no inquiry regarding it and paid 
no taxes nor water assessments. 
Plaintiff respectfully request that they be allowed to 
argue the matter orally prior to ruling. 
Dated t h i s 1s t day of August, 1986. 
tfALSH 
JEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES and REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT, to the Defendant, by 
mailing the same to B. L. DART, ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT, 
310 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 1330, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84101, this 
1st day of August, 1986. 
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some ambiguities therein, but we never con-
sidered the deed and payment therefor. 
We now hold that this case is moot inso-
far as the option or first opportunity to 
purchase is concerned because of the deed 
given to the Eckards. The judgment is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the 
trial court to enter judgment for the Eck-
ards. 
Costs are awarded to the appellants. 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, WILKINS 
and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMSCR SYSTEM^ 
Frank CARNESECCA and Mary Carnesec-
ca, his wife, and Joseph Carnesecca, Jr., 
and Janet Carnesecca, his wife, Plain-
tiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Bemice D. CARNESECCA and the Land 
Title Company, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No- 15051. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 6, 1977. 
Appeal was taken from a judgment of 
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. 
Robert Bullock, J., determining ownership 
of 18 acres and well thereon. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that; (1) evidence sus-
tained trial court's determination that con-
structive trust existed in favor of brother 
who orally purchased one-third interest in 
acreage in 1950 and (2) widow of one broth-
er was equitably estopped from asserting 
more than one-third interest in acreage 
where she agreed to sale documents reflect-
ing one-third interest in property in each of 
two brothers and herself, all parties, in re-
liance upon her conduct, bound themselves 
A -
to sale and widow did not oppose the one-
third division of sale proceeds until three 
weeks after her agreement to sell. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <*=> 1008.1(3) 
Supreme Court will defer to findings of 
fact finder rather than substitute its judg-
mtnt therefor unless it can be determined 
as matter of law that no one could reason-
ably find as did fact finder. 
2. Appeal and Error <*=»931(1) 
Supreme Court will view evidence, in-
cluding fair inferences to be drawn there-
from and all of circumstances shown there-
by, in light most favorable to successful 
pa/ty below. 
3. Trusts <s=»92!A 
Equity will impress a constructive tru.it 
upon property in favor of a beneficiary of 
an oral trust under certain circumstance* 
and no writing evidencing an intention U> 
create a trust is required. 
4. Trusts <8=>92V4 
A constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy arising by operation of law to pre-
vent unjust enrichment and is not within 
statute of frauds. U.C.A.1953. 25-5 2. 
5. Trusts <*=>U0 
Fact that parol evidence is admitted to 
prcve existence of constructive trust neces-
sarily requires a showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
6. Trusts «=»95, 102(1), 103(1) 
Usual circumstances giving rise to a 
constructive trust involve one unjustly prof-
iting through fraud or violation of duty 
imposed under fiduciary or confidential re-
lationship. 
7. Trusts <to63!A, 92% 
Trusts arising by implication or opera-
tion of law are excluded from effects nl 
statute of frauds. U.C.A.1953, 25-5-2. 
8. Limitation of Actions ^ 103(2) 
Argument that oral contract for broth-
er's purchase of one-third interest in !8 
acres owned by his two siblings was insd* 
missible in proceeding to determine owner-
ship of acreage by virtue of statute of limi-
tations had no application where there was 
no repudiation of contract or hostile asser-
tion. 
9. Witnesses <s=>126 
Purpose of dead man's statute is not to 
suppress truth but to prevent pr>of of 
claims against an estate of a deceased per-
son by false testimony. U.C.A.1953, 78-24-
2(3). 
10. Witnesses «=>126 
Dead man's statute, in limiting intro-
duction of testimony bearing upon the ulti-
mate truth, must be narrowly construed 
and applied strictly according to its terms. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
11. Witnesses «=» 140(7) 
Intent of dead man's statute is to dis-
qualify only those witnesses who have di-
rect interest adverse to interests of de-
ceased and his estate and statute has no 
application to those witnesses who have a 
mere interest in the estate when the xmtro-
versy between them is only as tx» their 
respective rights as heirs. U.C.A.19ii8, 78-
24-2(3). 
12. Trusts <*=»H0 
Evidence introduced in proceeding to 
determine ownership of 18 acres which two 
brothers purchased from their father in 
1942 sustained trial court's determination 
that constructive trust existed in favor of 
third brother who orally purchase*! one-
third interest in acreage in 1950. 
13. Estoppel *=»55, 58 
"Equitable estoppel" is conduct by one 
party which leads another party, in reliance 
thereon, to adopt course of action resulting 
in detriment or damage if first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
14 Estoppel <*=»78(3) 
Widow of one brother was equitably 
estopped from asserting more than one-
third interest in acreage where she agreed 
to sale documents reflecting one-third inter-
est in proj>erty in each of tw\ rothers and 
herself, all parties, in reliance upon her 
conduct, bound themselves to sale and wid-
ow did not oppose the one-third division of 
sale proceeds until three weeks after her 
agreement to sell. 
Jackson Howard, Robert C. Fillerup, 
Provo, for defendant and appellant. 
Thomas T. Billings, Keith E. Taylor, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
HALL, Justice: 
This appeal concerns a dispute as to the 
ownership of family property consisting of 
approximately 18 acres of land and a well 
thereon, situate in Utah County. 
The plaintiffs, Frank and Joseph Carne-
secca are the sons of Joseph Carnesecca, Sr., 
deceased, the remaining plaintiffs being 
their respective wives. Hereafter, all of 
said plaintiffs shall be referred to collec-
tively as "Frank and Joe." 
The defendant, Bernice D. Carnesecca, 
hereinafter referred to as "Bernice," is the 
surviving wife of Egidio Carnesecca, de-
ceased, hereinafter referred to as "Jim," 
who also was a son of Joseph Carnesecca, 
Sr., hereinafter referred to as "father." 
The father acquired the initial acreage 
which he operated as a farm with the pri-
mary assistance of Jim and Joe. In 1942, 
while Joe was away in the Navy, Jim and 
Frank purchased fot $900 the 18 acres in 
question and took title in their own names. 
At the end of the 1950 harvest there was 
a family gathering. Supposedly, all parties 
here were present, although Bernice denies 
being there. Nevertheless, at that meeting, 
father required Jim and Frank to permit 
Joe to purchase a one-third interest in the 
18 acres for the sum of $1,200. However, 
title remained in the names of Frank and 
Jim. 
In 1955 Jim and Joe determined a well 
was necessary to irrigate some 58 acres of 
the farm acquired by deed and inheritance 
from their father and the well was sunk, 
out of proceeds from the farm, on the 18 
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acres since it was the most advantageous 
site. 
Jim died in 1966 and Bernice inherited all 
of his property including one half of the 18 
acres, and one half of the remainder of the 
fgrm which she continued to operate with 
Joe until 1973 when they had a dispute. 
Thereafter the farm, excepting the 18 
acres, was sold and the proceeds divided one 
h*lf to each, Frank making no claim there-
to. 
In 1975 a meeting was held at Bernice's 
home at her instance and request since she 
had received an offer to purchase the 18 
acres. All parties were present, including 
the potential purchaser, Christensen, who 
presented documents of sale reflecting the 
record title of the well and land. It was 
ultimately agreed, however, that the sale 
must necessarily reflect a one-third owner-
ship of land and water in Frank, Joe and 
Bernice. The sale documents were modi-
fied accordingly and were subsequently ex-
ecuted, binding them irrevocably to the 
sale, but at the time for closing Bernice 
refused to sign, asserting a claim to one 
half of the net proceeds of sale. By stipula-
tion, the sale proceeds are still being held in 
escrow pending the disposition of this ap-
peal. 
The defendant Land Title Company was 
dismissed from the suit at pre-trial and the 
only issue tried below was the respective 
interests of the parties in the 18 acres and 
the well. The trial court declared Joe was 
the purchaser of a one-third interest in the 
land in 1950 and that thereafter Bernice 
and Frank held in trust for him. The court 
also declared Frank to be a one-third owner 
in the well and that Joe and Bernice held 
the same in trust for him. The court fur-
ther found that Bernice was estopped by 
her own conduct from asserting more than 
a one-third interest in the land and welt. 
1. Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568 P.2d 751 
(1977), 
Z. Id. 
3. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 299 
(1949). 
Bernice makes three claims of error, 1) 
the 1950 agreement was not admissible in 
evidence by virtue of the provisions of the 
Deadman Statute, Statute of Frauds and 
Statute of Limitations, 2) the evidence did 
not support a finding of constructive trust, 
and 8) the evidence did not support a find-
ing of estoppel. 
Frank and Joe contend the appeal merely 
reflects a dissatisfaction with the facts as 
found by the trial court. 
[I] The long established rules of appel-
late review, require this court to defer to 
the findings of the fact finder rather than 
substitute our judgment therefor, and such 
holds true unless it can be determined as a 
matter of law that no one could reasonably 
find as did the fact finder.1 
[2] The rules also require us to view the 
evidence, including the fair inferences to 1* 
drawn therefrom, and all of the circum-
stances shown thereby, in the light most 
favorable to the successful party below.1 
[<*-&} Equity will impress a constructive 
trust upon property in favor of a benefi-
ciary of an oral trust under certain circum-
stances and no writing evidencing an inten-
tion to create a trust is required. Such is 
an equitable remedy arising by opera ion of 
law to prevent unjust enrichment and is not 
within the statute of frauds.3 The fact thai 
parol evidence is admitted4 to prove it* 
existence necessarily requires a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence.5 
[€] The usual circumstances which give 
rise to a constructive trust would involve 
one unjustly profiting through fraud or the 
violation of a duty imposed under a fiduci-
ary or confidential relationship.6 
Tlie record is replete with evidence that 
the farm was a family oriented operation 
from its beginning. Its considerable auc-
4. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940 
(1933). 
5. Nielson v. Rasmussen, Utah, 558 P.2d 511 
(1976). 
«. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
(1VJ53). 
cess obviously resulted from the combined 
industry of the whole family which chose to 
operate in the nature of a partnership. 
Their relationship was one of trust, each 
relying upon the good faith of the other, 
usually without the benefit of written 
understandings. Father kept an abbreviat-
ed account of the farm business which re-
flected annual profits and the division 
thereof. There is a $1,200 entry in 1950 
which is supportive of the oral contract for 
Joe's purchase of a one-third interest in the 
18 acres. The over-all conduct of Jim and 
Prank in the years following the purchase is 
indicative of their recognition of Joe's joint 
ownership. 
All of such evidence, coupled with the 
testimony of Frank, Joe and their wives, is 
of the clear and convincing natur2 as has 
<^#n previously recognized by this court.7 
[7] The effectiveness of Bernice's stat-
ute of frauds argument is dispelled by the 
fact Joe has been in possession of the land, 
redeemed it from tax sale, expended con-
siderable sums to improve it, (planting, in-
stalling heating and irrigation systems and 
placing a well thereon) all of which is sub-
stantial evidence of a fully executed oral 
contract of purchase.8 Also, trusts arising 
by implication or operation of law are ex-
pressly excluded from the effects of thq 
statute.* 
[S] Similarly, the statute of limitations 
argument espoused by Bernice has no appli-
cation since there was no repudiation of 
contract nor hostile assertion by Jim (and 
thereafter by Bernice), and it was not until 
7. Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, i 16 P.2d 772 
(1941). 
8. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., <i Utah 2d 
18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956), citing various cases 
establishing the Utah doctrine of part perform-
ance. 
*. U.CA.1953, 25-5-2. 
10. In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 
P.2d 595 (1953). 
11. U.CA.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
12. Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 
P.2d 122 (1946). 
1975 that she took a poi i contrary to 
Joe's interest.10 
[9] In regard to the contention that the 
dead man statute l ! bars testimony relating 
to the 1950 contract of purchase, its applica-
tion must be viewed in light of the legisla-
tive purpose for its enactment. Its purpose 
was not to suppress truth but to prevent 
the proof of claims against an estate of a 
deceased person by false testimony.11 
[10, 11] The statute, in limiting the in-
troduction of testimony bearing upon ulti-
mate truth, must be narrowly construed u 
and applied strictly according to ita terms.14 
Its intent was to disqualify only those wit-
nesses who have a direct interest adverse to 
the interests of a deceased person and his 
estate and it has no application to those 
witnesses who have a mere interest in the 
estate when the controversy between them 
is only as to their respective rights as 
heirs.15 
[12] In the instant case there were four 
witnesses to the transaction, and in addi-
tion, the trial court found Bernice herself 
was present. That, together with the other 
evidence corroborates the trust agttfcment 
Consequently, even if some of the evidence 
may have been inadmissible there is sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the determina-
tion of the trial court that a constructive 
trust existed.1* 
Turning now to the matter of estoppel, 
the evidence is that Frank and Joe would 
not have agreed to the Christensen sale 
except for the agreement reached in 1975 
13c Morrison v. Walker Bank 6 Trust Co., 11 
Utah 2d 416, 360 P.2d 1015 (1961). 
14, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 
544 P.2d 481 (1975). 
15. Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677 
(1924). 
16. In re Estate of Sharp, Utah, 537 P.2d 1034 
(1975), citing Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 
381 P 2d 78 (1963) and also citing Del Porto v. 
Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972) as 
to the effect of Inadmissible testimony because 
of dead man statute. 
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with Bernice. That agreement was only 
reached after all of the sale documents 
were modified to reflect a one-third interest 
in Joe and to permit his one-third participa-
tion in the proceeds of the sale. The actual 
conveyance also was modified to reflect he 
and his wife as grantors. In reliance upon 
Bernice's conduct all parties bound them-
selves to sell and thus gave up a substantial 
legal right. It was not until some three 
weeks later that Bernice opposed the equal, 
one-third division of the sale proceeds, and 
such was the first challenge or repudiation 
of Joe's interest. 
f 13,141 These facts clearly meet the 
teat of equitable estoppel set forth in Koch, 
Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co.11 which is: conduct, 
by one party which leads another party, in 
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the 
ft*?* party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respon-
dents. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAU-
GHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
O | KCYNUMBERSYSTEM 
17. Utah, 534 P.2d 903 (1975). 
B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICTOR OLESON, a k a VICTOR : 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
DEE OLESON, : PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
P l a i n t i f f s , : 
v . : 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, a k a : C i v i l No. 22515 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
D e f e n d a n t . J u d g e C h r i s t o f f e r s o n 
——oooOooo 
COMES NOW t h e d e f e n d a n t , B a r b a r a Lynn J e p p s o n , by and 
t h r o u g h h e r a t t o r n e y s , and h e r e b y r e p l i e s t o P l a i n t i f f s ' 
Memorandum of P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s and s u p p l e m e n t s h e r 
Memorandum h e r e t o f o r e f i l e d . 
ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF'S AQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
P l a i n t i f f s ' pleadings a l l e g e they have acquired 
de fendan t ' s i n t e r e s t in the proper ty in d i spute s o l e l y due t o 
t h e i r payment of t axes for the r e q u i s i t e seven y e a r s . This 
1 
a l l e g a t i o n alone i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to support a cause of a c t i o n 
aga ins t defendant based upon adverse p o s s e s s i o n ; the adverse 
possessor must a l s o occupy and claim the property for seven 
continuous years during which time he has paid a l l taxes on the 
land . 78-12-12 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). P l a i n t i f f s have 
f a i l e d to s t a t e a cause of ac t ion upon which r e l i e f may be 
granted on a theory of adverse posses s ion and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e i r 
claim for the same should be denied . Assuming, however, that 
p l a i n t i f f s 1 p leadings are s u f f i c i e n t , then t h e i r claim of 
adverse p o s s e s s i o n should , n e v e r t h e l e s s , f a i l . 
An adverse c la imant 1 s a c t s in r e l a t i o n to the land must 
be open, t o r t i o u s , h o s t i l e and e x c l u s i v e so as to p l a i n l y 
manifest t o the owner and to the e n t i r e world that such a claim 
i s being made. Cooper v . Carter Oi l Company, 316 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1957) . A grantor remaining in p o s s e s s i o n a f t er conveyance i s 
presumed to hold the premises subserv ient to the r i g h t s of the 
g r a n t e e . Carlson v . S t a i r , 472 P.2d 598, 3 Wash. App. 27 (1970); 
Reid v . Reid, 348 P.2d 29 ( $ r 1 9 5 9 ) . S^e 3 Am. Jur. 2d 29^f 
See 39 A.L.R. 2d 353 . ^Hs 
In the present c a s e , p l a i n t i f f Victor Oleson 
( h e r e i n a f t e r "Victor") t e s t i f i e d that a t the time he conveyed the 
property t o defendant he to ld her that he would take care of the 
taxes and the property. The evidence c l e a r l y shows that from that 
A-3 0 
time forward the land Victor conveyed to defendant was not 
separated by any enclosure from the separate parcel plaintiffs 
continued to hold, nor was its 'use any different from the past 
< ^ . • — - - — - . — . 
and continuing use of p la in t i f f s 1 contiguous parcel . P la in t i f f s 
made no improvements on the property conveyed to defendant except 
to plant some grape vines which never bore f r u i t , gg-.rn.etely 
arranged for a third party to use the parcels in return for 
maintaining the properties. Uptil 1979, p l a i n t i f f s did pay 
certain property taxes on delg.nd.antf s land, however their payment 
of taxes and acts in relat ion to defendant's land were ent ire ly 
cons is tent with Victor1 s representation to defendant at the time 
she wasrconveyed the property that he would pay the taxes and 
take care of the property. P l a i n t i f f s ' acts in re lat ion to the 
land conveyed to defendant c lear ly did not, under these 
circumstances, plainly manifest to defendant that p l a i n t i f f s ' 
claim for adverse possession was being made. 
The evidence adduced at t r i a l c learly showed that i t 
was not unt i l 1979 that any conf l i c t re lat ing to the ownership of 
the property arose which may have manifested to defendant that an 
adverse claim to her property was being made. At that time 
p l a i n t i f f s suggested to defendant that sbe transfer the land to 
third part i e s . The evidence at t r ia l shows that from 1979 
forward the defendant paid taxes on her land for at l eas t three 
following years, thereby precluding p l a i n t i f f s from asserting a 
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c l a i m of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n b a s e d upon t h e i r a l l e g e d payment o f 
t a x e s f o r s e v e n c o n s e c u t i v e y e ^ r s even i f t h e i r a c t s in r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e l a n d from 1979 d id m a n i f e s t t o d e f e n d a n t t h a t a c l a i m was 
b e i n g , made. As l a t e a s J u l y , 1 9 8 0 , however , V i c t o r w r o t e 
d e f e n d a n t a l e t t e r a d v i s i n g t h a t she n o t s e l l h e r l a n d a t 
d e p r e s s e d p r i c e s s i n c e i t was v a l u a b l e and s h e c o u l d b u i l d on i t , 
but e n c o u r a g i n g h e r t o d o s o i n o r d e r t o f i n a n c e h e r p e r s o n a l 
o n c e - i n - a - l i f e t i r a e b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e . See E x h i b i t 1 2 . A l s o , t h e 
e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l shows t h a t p l a i n t i f f s and d e f e n d a n t h e l d a 
c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o n e a n o t h e r o v e r t h e y e a r s . Onder t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e v e n a s l a t e a s 1980 p l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t c l e a r l y 
m a n i f e s t t o d e f e n d a n t t h e i r c l a i m o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . 
Having f a i l e d t o c l e a r l y show t h a t t h e i r a c t s i n 
r e l a t i o n t o t h e l a n d conveyed t o d e f e n d a n t p l a i n l y m a n i f e s t e d t o 
d e f e n d a n t t h e i r c l a i m of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n f o r a p e r i o d of s e v e n 
c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s , and t h a t t h e y p a i d t a x e s on t h e l a n d d u r i n g 
t h a t t i m e p e r i o d , p l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n a g a i n s t 
d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d mus t b e d i s m i s s e d . 
2 . PLAINTIFFS ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY BY 
TRUST AND CANNOT NOW SEEK CANCELLATION OF THE DEED. 
The S t a t u t e of F r a u d s a s c o d i f i e d in U t a h , b a r s any 
c l a i m e d i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y u n l e s s t h e i n t e r e s t i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n a deed o r c o n v e y a n c e i n w r i t i n g . See 2 5 - 5 - 1 U . C . A . 
4 
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(1953 , as amended). Where a deed conta ins no r e s e r v a t i o n s or 
e x c e p t i o n s , i t i s presumed to convey fee simple t i t l e . Hartman 
v . P o t t e r , 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979); Hatch v. Bas t ian , 567 P.2d 
1100 (Utah 1977); Jacobsen v . Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); 
57-1-3 U.C.A. (1953, a s amended). Parol evidence i s not 
admissable to i n t e r p r e t the g r a n t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n s where the words 
used in the grant are unambiguous. (Hartman, supra . ) 
Here, the deed from Victor conveying the property to 
defendant i s c l e a r and unambiguous on i t s face and grants 
defendant s o l e t i t l e to that property. On the face of the 
deed there i s no i n d i c a t i o n of any s o r t that a t r u s t was created 
a t the t ime of the conveyance. Victor t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l that 
he executed the deed to defendant , and had i t recorded with the 
i n t e n t to t rans fer t i t l e to defendant . Absent fraud, d u r e s s , 
mistake or the l i k e a t t r i b u t a b l e to the grantee , a competent 
grantor w i l l not be permitted to a t tack or impeach h i s own deed . 
Desert Centers , I n c . v . Glen Canyon, I n c . , 356 P.2d 2 86 (Utah 
1960 ) . Clearly a t law, no t r u s t was created for p l a i n t i f f s 1 
b e n e f i t a t the time p l a i n t i f f s conveyed the property to 
defendant by deed. 
Nor was an implied t r u s t created to p l a i n t i f f s ' b e n e f i t 
in e q u i t y a t the time defendant was conveyed her property . 
Although p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t in t h e i r memorandum at 3 tha t t h e i r 
t e s t i m o n i a l evidence i n d i c a t e s they placed the property in t r u s t 
5 
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a t the time of the conveyance to defendant, such parol evidence 
i s inadmissable in equi ty for purposes of e s t ab l i sh ing a t r u s t . 
They a l l e g e no fraud, mis take, duress or other wrongdoing 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to the defendant, and t h e i r parol evidence should 
be s t r i cken and not considered by the court* 
P l a i n t i f f s * Memorandum a t 2, obfuscates the ru l ing in 
the case of Matter of Es ta t e of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982), 
and misappl ies the circumstances in t h a t case to those present ly 
before t h i s c o u r t . The cour t in Hock held tha t where a party 
pays the purchase pr ice for property and a separa te grantor 
conveys l ega l t i t l e in the same t r ansac t ion to a grantee other 
than the person providing the purchase money, then a r e s u l t i n g 
t r u s t a r i s e s in favor of the par ty providing the purchase money* 
Under such circumstances the c h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ nf tho t ransac t ion it .gelf, 
r a the r than inadmissable evidence r e l a t i n g to the i n t e n t of the 
p a r t i e s , r a i s e s the r ebu t t ab l e inference tha t the grantee was not 
to take the property b e n e f i c i a l l y . Here, t h e r e was no purchase 
money paid a t the time of V i c t o r ' s conveyance to defendant . 
There was no grantor separate from p l a i n t i f f who conveyed the 
property to defendant* The charac te r of the t r ansac t ion does 
no t , under these c i rcumstances , r a i s e an inference against fee 
simple conveyance of the property to defendant , and parol 
evidence i s inadmissable to show t h a t t he re was a t r u s t created* 
6 
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No resul t ing trust arose in the transaction, and none should be 
implied by the court . 
Admittedly, parol evidence i s admissable to prove the 
existence of a constructive t rus t upon property, however, such a 
t rus t must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and must be 
scrutinized with great caution by the court . Carnesecca v. 
Cafrnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977); Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 
P.2d 511 (Utah 1976). The equitable remedy of a constructive 
t rus t i s for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment, and 
usually a r i ses only where one has unjustly profited through fraud 
or viola t ion of a duty imposed under a fiducuary or confidential 
r e l a t ionsh ip . Carnesseca, supra. Such a confidential 
_ —-\ 
re la t ionship must r i s e to a level approaching that of_duxess. As 
held in Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965) such a 
confidential relat ionship requires tha t the grantor repose such a 
high degree of confidence in the grantee that his will i s largely 
subst i tuted by that of the grantee and the grantee i s placed in a 
superior position in the t ransact ion; sincere affection, t rus t 
and confidence between the par t i es i s insufficient to establish 
a constructive t r u s t . 
In the case at bar , there i s no unjust enrichment to 
defendant a t t r ibu table to any wrongdoing on her par t , and no 
evidence adduced at t r i a l supports such a conclusion. Pla int i f fs 
allege no fraud by defendant, and if there was any inequality of 
7 
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p o s i t i o n between the p a r t i e s a t the time the property was 
conveyed to defendant, i t was Victor Oleson who was in a 
superior p o s i t i o n ; defendant was at that time in a weakened 
emotional and psycho log ica l s t a t e and under treatment for trauma 
r e s u l t i n g , in par t , from the t rus t she had once reposed in 
p l a i n t i f f , Victor Oleson. Though the p a r t i e s may have had a 
c l o s e personal r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h i s a lone i s not s u f f i c i e n t to 
impose a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t based upon a c o n f i d e n t i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p * Victor t e s t i f i e d that he recorded the deed 
conveying the property to defendant with the i n t e n t i o n of 
t rans ferr ing an i n t e r e s t in t i t l e to the defendant . Although 
he t e s t i f i e d that a t one time he d i scussed with defendant the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of p lac ing t i t l e to the property in the name of 
someone e l s e to r e t a i n the b e n e f i t s of the property in h imsel f , 
h i s further test imony was t h a t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n took p lace some 
two years prior to the conveyance of the property to defendant. 
No other d i s c u s s i o n s were had regarding t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y pr ior to 
or a t the time he conveyed the property to defendant. Certainly 
such a remote d i s c u s s i o n does not e s t a b l i s h a c o n f i d e n t i a l or 
f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g between the p a r t i e s some two 
years l a t e r . 
There i s simply no evidence which would c l e a r l y 
i n d i c a t e the c r e a t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t a t the time of the 
t r a n s a c t i o n , and none should be imposed by the c o u r t . 
8 
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Further, p l a i n t i f f s are barred from now seeking 
cancel lat ion of the deed to defendant by 78-12-25 U.C.k. (1953, 
as amended) requiring an action for r e l i e f not otherwise provided 
by law to be* brought within four years. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaint i f f s* acts in re lat ion to the property conveyed 
to defendant did not plainly manifest their adverse claim, nor 
did p l a i n t i f f s pay taxes on the land for the requis i te seven year 
period. Accordingly, their claim of adverse possession must 
f a i l . Since there i s no writing evidencing a trust or contract 
at the time of the conveyance to defendant, p l a i n t i f f s are barred 
from asserting the same by the Statute of Frauds. No 
circumstances here indicate that an implied trust arose at the 
time of the conveyance to defendant. The p l a i n t i f f , Victor 
Oleson, was the grantor, and provided no purchase money in the 
transact ion. The character of the transaction does not imply a 
result ing trust . Nor do the circumstances at the time of the 
transaction imply a constructive t rus t . There was no fraud at 
the time of the transaction, no confidential re lat ionship , nor a 
fiduciary re la t ionship . There was no overreaching in any way at 
the time of the transaction, nor any wrongdoing whatsoever 
at tr ibutable to the defendant. Defendant was gi f ted the 
property. She has not unjustly profited in receiving the 
9 
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p r o p e r t y conveyed to her by p l a i n t i f f s , and her t i t l e in the 
same should be q u i e t e d in her s o l e name c o n s i s t e n t with t h e 
te rms of t h e w r i t t e n deed . 
DATED t h i s ->7* day of August , 1986. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
/< 2/ ^ 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
Z. 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. 
Attorney fo r Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on the / day of August, 1986, 
I mai led a copy of the fo rego ing Memorandum t o : 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Suite 202 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84109 
x 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
AMAR OLESON and THELMA 
EE OLESON, 
Plaintiff 
>ARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
ARBARA LYNN OLESSON JEPPSON, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 22515 
This is a quiet title action brought by the plaintiff to 
lave the plaintiff declared the sole owner of certain real 
property located in Cache County. The property in question 
//as bought in 1961 by the plaintiff from John and Clara Krebs. 
For payment, the deed was obtained and recorded on November 
7, 1969. The same day the plaintiff conveyed a portion of 
this property which is now the property in dispute, to the 
defendant by warranty deed for the recited sum of $10.00 and 
other valuable consideration. The deed was accepted by the 
defendant and recorded on that day. 
The defendant is the step-daughter of the plaintiff. At 
the time of transfer they were apparently good friends although 
the defendant testified of an illicit relationship between herself 
and the plaintiff in her adolescence, and the plain^i^f declaring 
that* he was sorry about the relationship and wa$presenting the 
property as a gift to the defendant. # ^ > 
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It is the position of the plaintiff that the property was 
conveyed to the defendant in trust as an expressed trust based 
upon agreement. It is the position of the plaintiff that 
he had difficulty in his first marriage and had now just re-
married and wanted no difficulties concerning property in his 
new second marriage to Thelma Oleson one of the present plaintiffs. 
It was in 1969, he states, he asked the defendant what to do to 
protect himself from his new wife from taking the property because 
the plaintiff was at that time employed by an attorney. It is the 
plaintiff's position that her advice was to put the property in 
someone elses name. This raises certain questions as to the 
plaintiff's position, because if he says he was deeding the 
property to the defendant to protect himself from his new wife 
taking it, why would he have his new wife present at this time and 
sign the deed. Also, the question arises if he is doing this to 
protect his ownership in all 8.7 of the acres, why would he convey 
only 2.2 acres to the defendant. Why would he wait 10 years until 
19 79 to ask for the property back. The defendant recalls no con-
versation that relates to any conditions under which she was to 
hold title to the property. 
The Court finds under these circumstances there was no express 
trust. There was recited consideration in the deed and further 
it is recognized that love and affection is good consideration to 
support a deed. If not for consideration, certainly there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the defendants position 
that it was given as a gift. The deed was delivered, accepted, and 
recorded. 
The Court, therefore, finds no express trust based upon the 
acts. In addition, the plaintiff states if no express trust there was 
n implied trust. In order for there to be an implied trust, it 
ust be shown by inference that the grantee was not to take the 
roperty beneficially. See the Estate of Hock, 655 P.2nd 1111 
Utah 19 82). Hock held that when a party pays the purchase price 
or property and the separate grantor conveys legal title in the 
;ame transaction to a grantee other than the person providing the 
mrchase money, then a resulting trust arises in favor of the 
)arty providing the purchase money. No such circumstances existed 
m this case as there was no purchase money paid at the time of 
/ictor's conveyance to the defendant. Further more, there is no 
showing of fraud, mistake, duress, or other wrong doing attributable 
to the defendant. Hence no implied or resulting trust. 
The plaintiffs further allege in the alternative that if the 
defendant acquired an interest in the property, the plaintiffs 
have since acquired the property back by reason of adverse possession, 
and they paid taxes for the requisite seven years and occupied the 
same. The plaintiff frimself testified himself that at the time 
he conveyed the property to the defendant, he told her that he 
would take care of the taxes on the property. For a claim of 
adverse possession to be valid, it must be shown that the acts of 
the person claiming by adverse possession to be open, tortious, 
hostile and. exclusive so as to plainly manifest to the owner and 
the entire world that such claim is being made. Such is not the 
case here, but in fact, it is the plaintiff's claim that he was 
taking care of the property for her. He did so by arranging 
generally for a third—party to use the parcels in return for 
maintaining the property• In fact, the testimony and correspondence 
Exhibit 12, indicates the plaintiff, 10 years later, was asJcing 
for only part of the property back which would contradict his 
position of adverse claim to the whole 2,2 acres. 
The Court therefore finds, that the plaintiffs have failed to 
establish an interest in the property in question either by reason 
of express or implied trust, or by reason of adverse possession. 
The Court therefore rules in favor of the defendant on her 
counterclaim and orders title to the subject property to be quieted 
in her name. Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate 
findings and judgment. 
Dated this 26th day of September, 19 86. 
BY THE COURT: ^ 
'/ / / 
Veftoy JtlKri^i/of f ersen 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
JoRh' W i s h .- j i j ^ 8 # ^ T l B « 2 ^ B lvd . , Suite 202 - SLC, Utah 84109 
B, L. Dart - .^/§o v - [ fa±Tr S*;Y$1330 - SLC, Utah 84101 
s 26th d*Y #f v Sept*; » I ^"{$6 
. fH 3. ALLEN- Cta^ ; . t ^ 
Jy 
• L. DART (818) 
OHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930) 
/ttorneys for Defendant 
10 South Main, Suite 1330 
>alt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'elephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
/ICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
DEE OLESON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, 22515 
Judge Christofferson 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
pursuant to notice on the 17th day of June, 1986, at the hour 
of 10:00 a.m., the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
presiding; plaintiffs appearing in person and being 
represented by their attorney, John Walsh, and defendant 
appearing in person and being represented by her attorney, B* 
L. Dart; and the Court having received sworn testimony of the 
parties, having received documentary evidence, having heard 
argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises and having entered its Memorandum Decision, now 
makes and enters its: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1961, plaintiff Victor Oleson purchased 
certain real property from John and Clara Krebs. 
2. For payment, a deed conveying this certain real 
property to plaintiff Victor Oleson was obtained by him and 
subsequently recorded on November 7, 1969. 
3. Plaintiffs married one another subsequent to 
the purchase of this certain real property by plaintiff 
Victor Oleson and prior to the date the conveyance was 
recorded. 
4. On November 7, 1969# plaintiffs conveyed a 
portion of this property to defendant by warranty deed 
without reservation or exception for the recited sum of 
$10.00 and other valuable consideration. The deed is 
unambiguous on its face. 
5. This portion of property conveyed by plaintiffs 
to defendant is the real property in dispute between the 
parties hereto and is situate in Cache County, State of Uf&h, 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 0.5 chains North of 
a point 581.81 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the * Southeast Quarter of 
Section 14, Township 12 North, Range 1 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 484 feet; thence 
North 1°55' East 200 feet; thence West 
484 feet; thence South 200 feet to the 
place of beginning. 
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6. The warranty deed describing the property in 
lispute was executed and recorded by Plaintiffs, on November 
1, 1969 with the intent to transfer title to said property to 
defendant. These actions constituted a delivery of the deed 
to defendant. 
7. At the time the property in dispute was 
transferred by plaintiffs to defendant, the defendant was the 
step-daughter of plaintiff Victor Oleson, Plaintiffs and 
defendant were good friends, although, there was an illicit 
relationship between defendant and the plaintiff during 
defendant's adolescence. Defendant testified that plaintiff 
declared he was sorry about this relationship and was 
transferring the property in dispute to defendant as <i gift-
8. Plaintiff* Victor Oleson testified that the 
property in dispute was transferred by plaintiffs to 
defendant for the purpose of protecting this property frora 
any ^ future claims to the same by his second wife, plaintiff 
Thelma Oleson; however, plaintiff Thelma Oleson was present 
at the time the property in dispute was transferred to 
defendant, she signed the deed transferring this property to 
defendant, the property in dispute transferred by plaintiffs 
to defendant was only a portion of the total acreage owned by 
plaintiff Victor Oleson at the time of transfer, and 
3 
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plaintiffs did not seek return of the property in dispute 
until some ten years after transfer of the same, 
9, There exists no written contract, deed, or 
other conveyance evidencing any continuing interest of 
plaintiffs in the property in dispute, and defendant recalls 
no conditions between the parties as to defendant's title to 
the property in dispute• 
10^ No purchase money was paid by plaintiffs at 
the time the property in dispute was transferred to 
defendant. 
11. There was no fraud, mistake, duress, or other 
wrongdoing attributable to defendant at the time of the 
transfer of the property in dispute to defendant. 
12* At the time the .property in dispute was 
conveyed to defendant, plaintiff Victor Oleson told defendant 
that he would take care of the taxes and the property. 
Plaintiff paid some taxes on this property and also arranged 
generally for a third party to use the property in return for 
maintaining the same. Plaintiff's conduct in relation to the 
property in dispute and in conformity with his 
representations to defendant were not open, tortious, hostile 
and exclusive of defendant's interest in the property so as 
to clearly manifest to defendant a claim of adverse 
possession. 
4 
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13. From 1979 forward, the defendant paid taxes on 
3 property in dispute for at least three following years, 
aintiffs have not paid taxes on this property for seven 
ars from 1979 forward. 
14. Ten years after plaintiffs' transfer of the 
operty in dispute to defendant, plaintiff Victor Oleson 
quested that he be returned only a portion of the property, 
ereby contradicting his position of adverse claim to the 
rtire acreage transferred to defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court hereby adopts as Conclusions of Law 
ich conclusions as may be inherent in or implied from the 
>regoing Findings of Fact. 
2. There is insufficient evidence to support 
Laintiff's theory of expressed -trust or contract between the 
arties relating to the property in dispute whereby defendant 
as to hold the same for plaintiffs benefit. Plaintiffs 
econd and fourth causes of action for breach of contract and 
ased upon express trust should be dismissed with prejudice. 
3. There was-adequate consideration supporting the 
leed transferring defendant sole title to the property in 
lispute. Further, if this transfer was not for consideration 
:hen there is clearly sufficient evidence showing the 
transfer to be a gift of fee simple title to defendant. 
5 
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4. There was no fraud, mistake, duress, or other 
wrongdoing attributable to defendant at the time defendant 
was transferred the property in dispute, 
5. Defendant has not been unjustly enriched* 
6. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for quantum 
meruit should be dismissed with prejudice. 
7. By virtue of the ruling in Estate of Hock, 655 
P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982), no resulting trust or implied trust 
arose between the parties, and plaintiffs' third cause of 
action based upon such a theory should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
8. Plaintiffs have failed to show that their acts 
in relation to the property in dispute were open, tortious, 
hostile and exclusive to defendant's interest in the property 
so as to clearly manifest to defendant and the entire world 
that a claim of adverse possession was being made. 
9. Plaintiffs first and sixth cause of action 
based upon quiet title and adverse possession should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
10. Defendant is the sole owner of the property in 
dispute as among the parties. Plaintiffs' claims thereto are 
without any right, title, estate, lien, or interest to the 
property in dispute or any part thereof. Defendant's 
counterclaim for an order quieting title to the property in 
6 
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ispute in her name as among the parties to this action 
hould be granted and defendant should be adjudged owner in 
ee simple entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of 
.he property in dispute. 
11. Each party should be responsible for their own 
:osts and attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
>£ 2 DATED this M day of Ocfeofcrer, 19^6. 
BY THE COURT: 
/y 
VeNoy Christofferson 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
/y 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
jeppson.fin 
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B. L. DART (818) 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR : 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
DEE OLESON, : DECREE AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : Civil No. 22515 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka : Judge Christofferson 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
pursuant to notice on the 17th day of Junef 1986# at the hour 
of 10:00 a.m., the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
presiding; plaintiffs appearing in person and being 
represented by their attorney, John Walsh, and defendant 
appearing in person and being represented by her attorney, B. 
L. Dart; and the Court having received sworn testimony of the 
parties, having received documentary evidence, having heard 
argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises and having entered its Memorandum Decision; and the 
Court having now made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
1 
onclusions of Law and being now fully advised on the 
remises; it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs7 complaint and all causes of action 
herein are hereby dismissed as against defendant with 
irejudice. 
2. As among the parties hereto, the defendant, 
Barbara Lynn Jeppson aka Barbara Lynn Oleson Jeppson, is 
lereby declared and adjudged to be the owner in fee simple 
>f, and entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of, 
:hat certain real property situate in Cache County, State of 
Jtah, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 0.f5 chains North of 
a point 581.81 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 14, Township 12 Uorth, Range 1 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 484 feet; thence 
North 1*55' East 200 feet; thence West 
484 feet; thence South 200 feet to the 
place of beginning. 
3. Further as between the parties hereto, the 
plaintiffs have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in 
and to the real property herein described or any part 
thereof. 
4. Each party shall be responsible for their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this quiet title 
action. 
2 
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DATED this , u day of-^eteber, 198/. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
/ t>/ 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
jeppson.dec 
/ ^ 
VeNoy Christofferson 
District Court Judge 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SUITE 202 COVE POINT PLAZA 
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 272-8425 
COMPLAINT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR* ; 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA 
DEE OLESON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
Defendant. Civil No. 
oOo 
Come now the Plaintiffs, VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, and THELMA DEE OLESON, by and through their 
Attorney, John Walsh, and complain and allege against the above 
named defendant as follows: 
1. This is a quiet title action, made pursuant to 
78-40-1 and following of the Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Plaintiffs are the sole owners of a certain 
parcel of real property located in Cache County, State of Utah, 
more particularly described as follows: 
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Beginning at a point 0.5 chains North of a point 
581.81 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 14, Township 12 North, 
Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 484 feet; thence North i°55l 
East 200 feet; thence West 484 feet; thence South 
200 feet to the place of beginning. 
3. Defendant claims an interest and estate in said 
property adverse to the Plaintiffs. 
4. Defendant's claim is without any right whatever, 
and Defendant has no right, estate, title, lien, or interest 
in or to the property, or any part thereof. 
5. By virtue* of the foreoing, the Plaintiffs allege 
that they own the property outright. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Plaintiffs incorporate in this the Second Cause 
of Action, all of the allegations contained in paragraphs one 
through five inclusive, as if fully set forth herein. 
7. That on or about November 7, 1969, the Plaintiffs 
created an express trust with the Defendant, wherein the 
Defendant has to hold the same in trust for the Plaintiffs. 
8. That pursuant to the terms of the said trust, 
the Plaintiffs have made demand upon the Defendant for the 
latter to return the said real property. 
9. That the Defendant has failed and refused to do 
the same and therefore is in breach of an express trust. 
10. Plaintiffs by virtue of the foregoing, submit that 
the Defendant should be required to vest the said property in 
them, consistent with the terms of the express trust. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
11. Plaintiffs incorporate in this the Third Cause 
of Action, all of the allegations contained in 11 through 110 
inclusive as if fully set forth herein. 
12. That on or about November 7, 1969 the Plaintiffs 
and the Defendant entered into an implied trust or equitable 
trust relationship. 
13. That consistent therewith, the Plaintiffs placed 
the title of the foregoing in the sole name of the Defendant, 
with the express intent and purpose to be held in trust for 
the Plaintiffs. 
14. That consistent therewith, the Plaintiffs have 
made demand upon the Defendant for the latter to return the 
said real property. 
15. That the Defendant has failed and refused to 
do the same and therefore is in breach of the implied or equitable 
torus t. 
16. That as a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs 
submit that the title to the said real property should be vested 
in them, consistent with the said trust. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiffs incorporate in this the Fourth Cause 
of Action, all of the allegations contained in 11 through 116 
inclusive, as if fully set forth herein. 
18. That on or about November 7, 1969 the Plaintiffs 
and the Defendant entered into a contract. 
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19. That consistent therewith, the Plaintiff was to 
vest the said real property in the name of the Defendant, and 
the Defendant was to hold the same, until the Plaintiffs requested 
that the same be returned to them* 
20. That consistent therewith, the Plaintiffs have 
made demand upon the Defendant, to retxarn the said property to 
them, pursuant to the said contract. 
21. That the Defendant has failed and refused to do 
the same, and therefore is in breach of the contract with the 
Plaintiffs. 
22. That as a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs 
submit that the title to the siad real property should be vested 
in them, consistent with the said contract. 
FIFTH CAUSE. OF ACTION 
23. Plaintiffs incorporate in this the Fifth 
Cause of Action, all of the foregoing allegations contained 
jln paragraphs one through twenty two inclusive, as if fully 
set forth herein. 
24. That the Defendant has taken the said property 
from the Plaintiffs and has not paid for the same. 
25. That the Defendant, by virtue of the foregoing 
has been unjustly enriched to the injury and damage of the 
Plaintiffs. 
26. That by virtue of the foregoing, the said property 
should be returned to the Plaintiffs, on the basis of quantum 
merit or unjust enrichment. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
27. Plaintiffs incorporate in this the Sixth Cause* 
of Action, all of the allegations contained in paragraphs one 
through twenty six inclusive, as if fully set forth herein. 
28. Plaintiffs have paid the taxes on the said 
property since and before November 1979, and therefore have 
acquired the said property to the exclusion of the Defendant 
by adverse possession. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
the Defendant as follows :# 
29. That the defendant, and all persons claiming 
under her, be required to set forth the nature of said claims 
to said real property. 
30. That all adverse claims to said real property 
be determined by a decree of this court. 
31. That said decree declare and adjudge that Plaintiffs 
own in fee simple, and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful 
possession of, said real property; and that the Defendant, and 
all persons claiming tinder her, have no estate, right, title 
lien, or interest in or to said real property or any part 
thereof. 
32. That said decree permanently enjoin Defendant, 
and all persons claiming under her, from asserting any adverse 
claim to Plaintiffs1 title to said property. 
33. For costs and attorneys fees in this action, and 
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34. For such other and additional relief as the 
Court finds fit and proper under the premises. 
Dated this ^ f day of January, 1984..-
J0RN~WAL"STr 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SUITE 202 COVE POINT PLAZA 
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BQULEVAR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: 272-8425 
